Designing a welfare maximising water tariff for Durban with Ramsey pricing principles. by Bailey, W. Reg.
DESIGNING A WELFARE MAXIMISING
WATER TARIFF FOR DURBAN
WITH RAMSEY PRICING PRINCIPLES
Submitted by
Reg Bailey
MBA dissertation submitted as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
MBA in Water Management
School of Business
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg
September 2003
bL~ .1.. ~AI





I hereby certify that this dissertation was independently written by me. No material was used
other than that referred to. Sources directly quoted and ideas used, including figures, tables







This dissertation was only made possible with support and cooperation of many individuals.
I would like to record my sincere thanks to Neil Macleod, Head of Water and Sanitation at the
eThekwini Municipality in Durban for his support. In particular, his willingness to listen and
share ideas with me and his personal efforts to ensure that I was given access to the historical
billing records of water consumption.
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Chris Buckley for the personal interest and
encouragement he has given me in developing the research.
Finally to my wife Chantal and our three boys, Luke, Daniel and Jordan. Without your
understanding and support, none of this would have been possible. I thank you.
1ll .
Abstract
A water supply tariff is a powerful water management tool that can be used to promote a
number of economic, environmental and social-political objectives. In South Africa,
increasing block tariffs are deemed to satisfy the domestic tariff regulations of the Water
Services Act of 1997. The regulations require that the tariff supports the viability and
sustainability of water supply services to the poor and discourages wasteful or inefficient
water use.
The application of increasing block tariff structures presents a number of problems. The main
issue being the size and price of each block. Ramsey pricing proposes that consumer welfare
is maximised when the mark-up in price above cost of a good is proportional to the price
elasticity of demand of the good. This principle was applied in setting the block prices of an
increasing block water tariff. The sizes of the blocks were based on the average water
consumption of low, middle and high income consumers.
The water demand characteristic of low, middle and high income households from a sample
of domestic consumers in Durban were investigated. The water demand functions and price
elasticity of demand for the three groups were estimated using econometric models. Two
tariff structures based on Ramsey pricing principles were proposed and compared with the
current increasing block tariff applied in Durban.
The frequency distribution of demand of each of the three consumer groups were applied in a
model to ensure the proposed tariffs met a certain revenue target. The water demand functions
of each of the consumer groups were used to model how the proposed tariff structures
impacted consumer surplus and water demand.
The investigation found that increasing block tariffs designed with Ramsey pricing principles
have a positive impact on social welfare, provide sufficient revenue for water service
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1 Introduction
A water supply tariff is a powerful management tool that can used to promote a number of
economic, environmental and social-political objectives. A well-designed water tariff can
achieve some objectives simultaneously, for example economic and environmental objectives,
while in other cases tradeoffs may have to be made (Boland and Whittington, 2000, p220).
Water service providers need tools and guidance in order to propose tariffs that are welfare
maximizing, meet economic requirements and do not harm the environment.
The primary objective of tariff setting for municipal officials is to secure sufficient revenue
from water sales to cover the cost of providing the service. The primary objective of
policymakers, especially in developing countries with extreme income inequalities, is that
basic water services are affordable. Increasing block tariff pricing structures are the main
approach used in developing countries to address problems of unequal income distribution
and provide fair access to water (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997, p4). In South Africa,
increasing block tariffs are deemed to satisfy the domestic tariff regulations under the Water
Services Act of 1997 (DWAF, 2001, section 6(2))
The application of increasing block tariffs structures presents a number of problems. The
main issue being the size and price of each block. Policymakers must set the size of the first
block equal to a household's essential water needs in order to successfully target the poor.
Politicians will want this block to be as large as possible, however each increment in the size
of this first block will raise the price of subsequent blocks.
On the 14th of February 2001, the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry announced that local
government in South Africa would provide 6 000 litres of free water per household per month
(Kasrils, 2001, paragraphs 1-3). He further added that free basic water is to be funded using a
combination of the equitable share grant fund from national government and internal cross-
subsidies from appropriately structured water tariffs in a manner which best reflects the
specific situation in the respective local government area.
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In July 2003, at the celebration in Durban of the nine millionth person to receive safe water
since 1994, Minister Kasrils made a promise to the people of South Africa (Kasrils, 2003,
paragraph 6). His words were
... The promise for the next ten years is to move up the ladder, from communal tap to
the convenience and dignity of having water in people's own yards with each
household having its own toilet and even, in time, hot and cold running water inside
the house enjoyed by many more ofour people. That's what J mean by climbing the
water ladder. As we climb the ladder, so our people will experience better and better
standards ofsupply and services ...
It is clear from the regulations and the Ministers speeches that the national government
expects municipalities to structure the water tariff so that it is possible for poor households to
receive 6 kL per month of free basic water, and be able to afford higher levels of service in
future. The increasing block tariff must cross subsidise the cost of consumption of low
income households by taxing the consumption of high income households. The tariff must
still ensure that sufficient revenue is collected over and above the equitable share subsidy to
ensure the sustainability of water services. This poses the question; what is the optimum
increasing block tariff structure that will allow fair and equitable cross subsidisation while
maintaining revenue sufficiency?
Welfare economics proposes that the solution to this problem is based on maximizing the sum
of Marshallian Consumer Surplus for different income groups subject to the tariff schedule.
Ramsey's 1927 contribution to the theory of taxation provides us with a solution to this
problem of welfare maximization under a revenue cost constraint (Ramsey, 1927, pg 47). Bos
demonstrates how the Ramsey formula reduces to an inverse elasticity rule for public utilities
applying peak load pricing (Bos, 1981, pg 56). In this case the ratio of price-cost margins of
the tariff blocks is equal to the reciprocal ratio ofthe price elasticities of demand.
Ramsey pricing appears to be a simple yet robust method of achieving welfare maximization
under a revenue cost constraint. Is this really the case?
Setting water supply tariffs will remam a contentious Issue. It is hoped that with sound
econometric principles, a tariff can be developed that maximizes welfare, meets economic
requirements and does not harm the environment. The tariff should then be politically and
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sociably acceptable and enable the national government to fulfil its promise of affordable
water for all its people.
1.1 Objectives
The purpose of the research in this dissertation was to investigate if a tariff based on Ramsey
pricing principles resulted in an increase in welfare for the domestic water consumers of
Durban. The specific objectives of the research were:
• Establish ~he water demand characteristics of domestic households in Durban.
• Estimate the demand function and associated demand price elasticity of low, middle
and high income households.
• Estimate the marginal cost of domestic water supply
• Propose an increasing block tariff based on Ramsey pricing principles
• Compare the impact on welfare of the proposed tariff against that of the current tariff
by measuring the change in consumer surplus.
• Present the findings and make recommendations to the Durban city council regarding
the application of Ramsey pricing principles in setting water tariffs.
1.2 Structure of the dissertation
The literature pertaining to the application of Ramsey pricing is reviewed in Chapter 2. In
Chapter 3 the methodology adopted in the research is presented. The existing domestic
consumer market was segmented into low, middle and high income households. A tariff block
was created for each segment by targeting the size and price of each block according to the
consumers revealed demands. Data for the research was collected from the municipal billing
system for representative samples of the three consumer groups. The research estimated the
water demand schedule and associated water demand price elasticity of each consumer group
from the historical records of monthly water consumption between 1997 and 2003. The
research also determined the cost of providing the service using data from the annual financial
statements of the ring-fenced municipal water service provider and regional bulk water
supplier. A new tariff is proposed using Ramsey pricing principles. The findings are presented
in Chapter 4.
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The dissertation compares the proposed increasing block tariff structure with the existing
tariff structure of Durban in Chapter 5, and concludes with some recommendations on tariff
setting for Durban. Chapter 6 presents recommendations for further research on this subject.
1-4
2 Literatu re review
The literature review covers a number of distinct subjects that provide a framework for the
study. An introduction to the micro economic theory of water demand is given in Section 2.1.
This section highlights some of the challenges in estimating the price elasticity of demand.
Section 2.2 reviews a number of previous studies on the price elasticity of domestic water
demand. A general discussion on the theory and practice of water tariff setting is then
presented in Section 2.3. The review continues with a discussion on the application of welfare
economics in tariff setting in Section 2.4. The literature review concludes with an
introduction to the principles of the Ramsey pricing formula in Section 2.5.
2.1 An introduction to the micro economic theory of water
demand
Economists use the term utility to refer to the expected pleasure or satisfaction a person
obtains from the consumption of goods and services. In the case of a single good or service,
total utility refers to the amount of satisfaction obtained from the person's entire consumption
of the product. Marginal utility refers to the amount of satisfaction received from consuming
the last or marginal unit of product. It is obvious that the satisfaction received from the first
glass of water consumed on a day to satisfy thirst is much higher than the third glass. This is
also known as the law of diminishing marginal utility. It is also possible for the marginal
utility to be negative, for example a person will obtain negative utility from trying to consume
a tenth glass of water in a short time period.
How much a person. is prepared to pay for a product depends on how much satisfaction they
expect to receive from its consumption. As it has been established that a person receives
increasingly smaller increments of utility from each additional unit of consumption, it can
also be assumed that they will be willing to pay progressively less for each additional unit of
the product. In other words, as the marginal utility of a good diminishes, so does their
willingness to pay. This law of demand is illustrated in Figure 2.1 with the downward sloping







Figure 2.1: An individuals theoretical demand curve for goods and services
The response of consumers to a change'in price is measured by the price elasticity of demand.
More specifically, the price elasticity of demand (e) refers to the percentage change in
quantity demanded (Q) divided by the percentage change in price (P). (Lipsey et aI, 1990,
pg 75).
. I .. ~%Opnce e astlclty & = ----
~%P
The more responsive the change in demand is to change in price, the greater the elasticity of
demand.
An important determinant of elasticity is the price of the good in relation to the consumer's
income. A small % increase in the price of an expensive good will have a larger impact on a
consumers budget than a small % increase in the price of a less expensive good. Likewise the
increase in price of a basic good will have a larger impact on a poor household in comparison
to a rich household.
The actual measurement and application of the price elasticity of demand presents a number
of challenges. The first requirement is an accurate estimate of the consumer demand function.
Assuming this information is available, the estimated elasticity will depend on the shape of
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the demand curve, the range over which the elasticity is measured, the time span covered in
measuring the elasticity response, and the method of calculation adopted.







Figure 2.2: Changes in elasticity along a straight-line demand curve
On this straight line curve an increase in price, example from Pl1 to P12 or from P21 to P22
results in a similar decrease in demand from QI I to Q12 or from Q21 to Qn respectably.
Assuming the difference in price P II - P 12 is equal to P21 - Pn , then the difference in quantity
QII - Q12 is equal to Q21 - Qn- However the percentage change in price (P12-PII)/PII is much
smaller than the percentage change in price (P22-P21)/P21. Similarly the percentage change in
demand (D12-Dll)/DII is much greater than the percentage change in demand (D22-D21)/D21'
As a result the observed movement of D 11 to D I2 will result in a much larger estimate of the
absolute value of price elasticity than a similar movement from D21 to Dn . Note that the
difference in these observed price elasticities diminishes over the range as the demand curve
becomes more convex.
In the previous discussion the average change in demand in response to a change in price over
a specific range was measured. This is known as the arc elasticity. Theoretical discussions use
the point elasticity, the responsiveness of demand to price at a specific -point on the demand
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curve. From its definition, the point elasticity is the derivative of the demand curve function at
a specific point (Lipsey et aI, 1990, pg 93). Obviously the calculated value of the arc elasticity
will be closer to the point elasticity as the length of the arc reduces.
The price elasticity of demand is also affected by time. The short run elasticity of demand
measures how consumers change their purchase decision immediately after a change in price
has been announced. In the case of commodities like water, electricity and petrol, the demand
is relatively inelastic in the short term, as these items are considered essential. In the long run
consumers will change their habits and invest in more efficient water appliances like dual
flush toilets, low flow showers and water efficient washing machines. The long run elasticity
of demand measures the consumer response to price after sufficient time has passed to assume
that all consumer adjustments to the changed price have occurred.
Assume there are three consumers all subject to the same water tariff. Each consumer will
have a unique curve describing their change in demand in response to tariff increases. Since
high income households will tend to purchase more water at the same price in comparison to
low income households, the demand curve for the high income household will be further from
the origin than the low income households. Lipsey et al (1990, pg 91) demonstrates that in the
case of parallel straight-line curves, the one furtherest away from the origin is less elastic than
the one closer to the origin at the same price.
Making an accurate estimate of price elasticity for a consumer under the conditions described
previously is challenging and easily criticised. An important consideration when comparing
price elasticities is that the demand curves have similar shape and the elasticity is measured
over the same range, during the same time period and by the same method.
A popular empirical method used by economists to deal with the challenge is the double log
regression (more commonly called a log linear regression by economists). The log of demand
is plotted against the log of price, transforming the curve into an apparently straight line.
Simple linear regression can then be estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) routine.
An attractive feature of the log-linear model is that the price elasticity of demand is given
directly by the coefficient of the price variable. The elasticity is also constant throughout the







Figure 2.3: Theoretical demand curve for a domestic water consumer
Figure 2.3 shows a theoretical demand' curve for a typical domestic water consumer (adapted
from Stephenson, 1999), As price increases from point B to point A, consumers will reduce
demand, only using water for high value used like drinking, cooking and basic health and
hygiene. Consumer demand will tend to be price inelastic at the limit. As price rises beyond
point A on the curve, the public water supply will be too expensive and the consumer will
find alternative lower cost water sources. Price elasticity is infinite at this point. High-income
households will invest in rainwater harvesting or groundwater extraction infrastructure. Low
income households will obtain water from unprotected rivers and streams, considering the
cost of poor health to be lower than the cost of the public water supply.
If the price decreases from point B to point C then the consumer will make more use of water
for low value uses or luxury consumption. For example washing cars, filling swimming pools
and watering exotic gardens. Price elasticity in this range tends to be more price elastic. At
point C the current capacity of available water resources and supply infrastructure is
exhausted and no further demand is possible, even with a drop in price. Price elasticity is zero
at this point.
It is interesting to note that in Figure 2.2 the calculated elasticity for low demand and high
price tended to be elastic, whereas in Figure 2.3 the same range is intuitively believed to be
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inelastic. If the demand curve for water at low demand and high price was vertical, the
calculated elasticity of demand would be 0, or perfectly inelastic. This once again emphasises
the importance of the shape of the demand curve
2.2 Price elasticity studies
There is an extensive list of price elasticity of water demand studies that have been conducted
in the developed world, in particular for urban and agricultural water use in the USA. Most
research has focussed on the methodology adopted and very little attention is given to the
application of the findings. There is also a wide range of results emanating from the research.
Approximately one third of estimates of elasticity are in the range 0 to - 0.3, a further third in
the range - 0.3 to - 0.6 and the balance are above -0.6. Ten percent of estimates show that
demand is elastic and greater than 1.0 (Eberhard, 1999a, pg 83).
A comprehensive study by Nieswiadomy and Molina in 1988 applied ordinary least squares
(OLS), instrumental variables (IV), and two stage least squares (2SLS) methodologies to
estimate water demand using micro data for a sample of 104 domestic consumers faced with
and increasing block tariff structure in Denton, Texas. They found that the price elasticity of
demand was not significantly different from zero, and concluded that this was due to the fact
that the cost of water was insignificant being less than 1 % of the households budget
(Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1988, pg 10).
In South Africa, Dockel (1973) attempted to detennine the price elasticity of water demand
for different water user categories in 27 municipalities between the period 1960 to 1970.
Dockel used aggregated annual consUIPption data and an average price for water. In some
cases there was insufficient time series data available to analyse consumption of specific
demand categories, for example in the black townships. Dockel found that the price elasticity
of water demand for white households was -0.69. He also found that income was not a
significant factor in detennining water demand (Dockel 1973, pg 20)
A more recent study in South Africa by Veck and Bill (2000) found the price elasticity oflow,
middle and high income households to be -0.14, -0.17 and -0.19 respectively for Alberton
and Thokoza using a contingent valuation approach (Veck and Bill, 2000, pg 5.9). Note that
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they found the elasticity of demand for low income households to be lower than that ofhiahero
income households. The elasticity was estimated according to the responses given by
households when asked how much water they would consume if the price of water were to
increase or decrease significantly. This approach is criticised because it cannot be assumed
that behavioural intention and actual behaviour are the same thing. However contingent
valuation experiments have proved useful in willingness to pay surveys where econometric
data are not available but is only valid as a short run estimate of the price elasticity of water
demand. Veck and Bill also developed an econometric model for Alberton using annual
consumption data between 1986 and 1993. They estimated the medium to long run price
elasticity of water demand to be -0.73, however they suggested that the model was not useful
because of the poor diagnostic statistics obtained (Veck and Bill, 2000, pg 6.5).
In an application of Ramsey pricing in Kerala, India, Pushpangadan and Murugan found the
price elasticity of demand for water in the 10 - 30 kL/month block to be -0.7. Their cross
sectional study was based on observing the change in demand of 355 households before and
after a tariff rate change. Floor area was used as a proxy for income and the impact of weather
on demand was not taken into account. (Pushpangadan and Murugan, 1998, pg 18)
It is clear from the studies presented here that both data quality and estimation method have a
significant impact on the results of price elasticity studies.
2.3 The theory and practice of tariff setting
A water tariff is a set of rules and regulations regarding prices, charges, and taxes that water
utilities use to collect revenue. The tariff is a powerful and versatile management tool that
officials can use to promote a number of objectives, although there are often tradeoffs
between objectives (Boland and Whittington, 2000, p220). Tariff setting is inevitably a
political process raising a lot of controversy in trying to find the correct balance between the
different objectives and the rights and needs of diverse groups. One of the reasons why tariff
setting is so controversial is that in many cultures new to institutional water supply, water is
seen as natural resource that should be made available free-of-charge. It is not easy to change
that vision of free abundant water, even when faced with the reality of water becoming an
increasingly scarce resource.
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There is also a call from Marxist supporters for the decommodification of water, i.e. remove
price altogether as a determinant in the production and consumption of water services
(McDonald, 2002, p33). McDonald provides ample criticism of the current cost recovery
framework, but unfortunately does not give any clear practical guidelines on how
decommodification will work, apart from making decisions based on the notions of shared
cultural values, etc. Pape (2002, p183) admits that it is easy to critique current cost recovery
case studies but struggles to propose an alternative. For the time being water supply in general
will continue to be viewed as a private good with only limited consumption necessary for
personal health and hygiene viewed as public goods.
Boland and Whittington (2000, p220-222) state that revenue sufficiency, economic efficiency,
income redistribution, and resource conservation are all important objectives of tariff setting.
Tariffs need to be equitable and fair or there will be problems with the political and public
acceptability of the tariffs. The revenue stability, ease of implementation and the simplicity
and transparency of the tariffs are also important considerations.
In a survey of 22 developing" and industrialised countries, Dinar and Subramanian (1997)
found that countries prioritise different objectives. Some wish to recover costs, some want to
transfer income between sectors through cross subsidisation, and others use charges to
improve water allocation and water conservation. For urban water supply most countries are
replacing flat fees with two part tariffs, a fixed charge and a variable charge, with
considerable variation between countries in the design of block rates. Most developing
countries and some industrialised countries set charges based on average rather than marginal
costs of supply. Only France sets urban water prices based on the long-term incremental costs
of supplying water to account for future resource development costs (Dinar" and Subramanian,
1997, p4).
Theoretically, in a competitive market, demand and supply determine price, and the price
equals marginal cost, therefore marginal cost rate design results in economic efficiency. This
occurs when the marginal value to consumers equals the marginal cost of production, and no
other quantity of water can increase the net value to society (Hall, 2000, p195). This
proposition ignores externalities and the public good aspects of water, as well as the market
failure resulting from the natural monopoly of urban water supply.
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Marginal cost pricing may also be regressive. If the aggregate consumer demand (including
industry, high income and low income households) is used to determine the market price, then
poor consumers will pay more for water and purchase less than they would if the market





Figure 2.4: Demand and supply curves for an average consumer and a poor consumer
(Goldblatt, 1999, pg 31)
In Figure 2.4, the efficient market clearing price (Pm) and quantity (Qm) is found at point A,
the intersection of the average demand and marginal supply curves. The marginal price Pm
will intersect the poor consumers demand curve at point B, resulting in low income
households paying price Pm for a quantity of Q*. If the market consisted only of low income
households, the efficient market clearing price and quantity will be at point C and poor
consumers will pay less for a larger volume of water at its marginal cost. Marginal pricing
therefore fails to serve low income households unless the market is differentiated. Remember
that the economic efficiency benefits of marginal prices are only applicable at the margin of
consumption. Therefore if the market is differentiated and the majority of consumers are
exposed to marginal prices at their marginal consumption then we can still achieve the
economic efficiency desired by economists.
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Figure 2.5: Consumer demand and marginal and average supply cost curves.
(Stephenson, 1999, pg 116).
Marginal pncmg may also result in a producer surplus for the water servIce provider
(Goldblatt, 1999, pg 31). Figure 2.5 shows the theoretical equilibrium condition between the
price and the quantity supplied and demanded for average costing and marginal costing
(Stephenson, 1999, pg 116). If the water service provider was to sell all water at the marginal
price Pm and the quantity demanded was Qm then economic efficiency will have been
achieved. However we must note that the revenue collected at this price [A-Qm-O-Pm]
exceeds the costs [B-Qm-O-C] by the area [A-B-C-Pm]. Since a public water service provider
may not make a profit this excess revenue is either consumed by inefficient water distribution
or becomes available for subsidising consumption for low-income households. If the marginal
supply cost curve was below the average supply curve at the point of intersection with the
demand curve, then marginal pricing would result in insufficient revenue to cover the cost of
supply.
A carefully designed increasing block tariff with the majority of consumers consuming in a
block set at the marginal price will achieve economic efficiency while still providing income
redistribution for lower income groups consuming in the lower consumption blocks. Hall
(2000, pg 195) notes that the calculation of the marginal cost of supply is a complex task. He
suggests that the simplest way to approximate the marginal cost is to calculate the incremental
cost of the next capital investme!!t in additional water supply capacity. Marginal cost pricing
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is typically defined by the World Bank as average incremental cost pricing, where the average
incremental cost is calculated by dividing the discounted value of future water supply costs by
the (similarly discounted) amount of additional water to be produced (Eberhard, 1999a,
pg 59).
This discussion on tariff setting concludes with the remark by Eberhard (1999b, pg 25).
...A generalised method which can be applied in order to determine the
appropriate price structures and tariffs in any specific urban area does not exist
and is not desirable ... The development ofan appropriate pricing policy must be
informed by both the national and local specific historical, socio-economic and
political-economic contexts ... The very real political-economy trade-offs integral
to price reform must be made with reference to local political decision making
processes ...
2.4 The application of welfare economics in water tariff setting
A consumer having a limited income at their disposal must make choices. Unlimited
quantities of all desirable goods and services are not affordable. Demanding more of one thing
will mean having less of another. Similarly society must make choices of how to use their
scarce resources of labour, capital and natural resources (Johansson, 1991, pg 1). Welfare
economics is concerned with how these decisions may benefit one group of society but not
make another worse off. Ideally welfare economics must guide decision makers so that Pareto
efficiency is attained in the economy, i.e. at which point it becomes impossible to improve the
situation of some individual in society without making someone else worse off.
A social welfare function expresses a view on the distribution of welfare in society and is
used to rank the possible states arising from decisions. An individual's welfare is measured by
their consumer surplus, the area under the graph of a consumers demand curve for a
commodity between the price they are willing to pay per unit and the market price they





Figure 2.6: Consumer surplus shown by the area under the consumer demand curve
above the price paid for all each unit of consumption. (Johansson, 1991, pg 41)
To measure social welfare we simply sum the individual consumer surpluses (Johansson,
1991, p48).
The consumer demand curve is generally referred to as a Marshallian market demand function
and it reveals how much a consumer is willing to pay in addition to the present price. The
Marshallian demand function is easily approximated using empirical observations of
consumer behaviour (Bos, 1981 p5). The Hicksian compensating variation and equivalent
variation methods of measuring consumer surplus were introduced as a more convenient way
of expressing the change in welfare arising from a change in the price of a good.
Unfortunately these measures are not observable in the market place (Johansson, 1991, p52).
This study was confined to the Marshallian demand function, since the Marshallian surplus
always lies between the two Hicksian surpluses and they are all only approximations of
welfare (Bos, 1990, p7),.
Moilanen and Schulz (2002, p358) used the Marshallian consumer surplus to model how
changes in policy approach will influence the optimal water tariff system. Their paper
considers utilitarianism, weighted utilitarianism, and Rawlsianism social welfare functions to
determine the best price discrimination rule for a low and high income consumer using a two
step increasing block tariff structure.
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2.5 Ramsey pricing
Frank P Ramsey (1903-1930) proposed a solution to the problem of raising a specific revenue
by taxing different consumer products in such a way that it minimises the reduction in
consumer utility (Ramsey 1927, pg 47). The taxes should be such that they reduce the
consumption of each commodity by the same proportion. He showed that the tax on each
commodity should be proportional to the sum of the reciprocals of each of the supply and
demand elasticities (Ramsey, 1927, pg 56). In the case of an absolutely inelastic commodity
all revenue can be raised through taxing it without reducing consumer utility, for example a
tax on whisky. The unknown factor in applying the theory is the curvature of the supply and
demand curves. The results will only be true for the applicable range of the estimated price
elasticity (Ramsey, 1927, pg 60).
In the case of a water service provider the guiding principle of Ramsey pricing is to construct
the tariff to maximize an aggregate of customers' benefits, subject to the constraint that the
service providers revenues cover its total costs. Additional constraints are also included in
some applications, including the constraint that no customer is worse off with Ramsey pricing
than the uniform price schedule that provides the same net revenue for the firm. The net effect
of Ramsey pricing is simply to reduce the percentage profit margin on each unit sold until the
service provider's revenue equals its total cost (Wilson, 1999, pg 112).
The price for each unit includes an ad valorum or value-added tax to meet the servIce
provider's revenue requirement. This tax is stated as a percentage mark-up inversely
proportional to the price elasticity of the demand for that unit. Units with lower price
elasticities are taxed more because their demands are curtailed less by the tax. In particular,
the tax imposes a welfare loss due to the resulting departure from the fully efficient demands
that would result from marginal cost pricing, and this welfare loss (as measured in terms of
consumers' surplus) is roughly proportional to the price elasticity. The resulting pricing rule
uses the firm's monopoly power efficiently to meet the revenue requirement (Wilson, 1999,
pg 117).
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Non-linear tariffs derived from the principles of Ramsey pricing suppose that the service
provider is allowed to charge different prices for different increments. If marginal cost is
constant then this is a kind of price discrimination created solely by the design of the tariff,
since typically increments sold to one customer are generically the same, and the same as
those sold to other customers. It is due to the utilities monopoly power that it is able to
differentiate prices in an efficient way that allows it to meet its revenue requirement, with the
restriction that the same tariff is offered to all customers (Wilson, 1999, pg 118).
Bos (1981, pg 56) provides a simple interpretation of Ramsey pricing, applicable to situations
where cross price elasticity can be ignored because it is small in comparison with the direct
elasticity. The Ramsey fonnula reduces to an "inverse elasticity rule"
Where:
Pi = price of /h tariff block
C = marginal cost of i1h tariff block.
Ei = price elasticity of demand of i1h tariff block




This section of the dissertation presents the process followed in applying the Ramsey pricing
principles to develop an alternative increasing block tariff. The problem statement is given in
Section 3.1. The recent history of water supply and current water demand characteristics of
consumers in Durban is presented in Section 3.2. This provides a context for the analysis that
follows. Section 3.3 deals with the sampling and data collection process. The statistical
analysis of the data is presented in Section 3.4 with the regression analysis being covered in
Section 3.5. The output ofthe regression analysis is the estimated demand function and price
elasticity of demand for low, middle and high income households. In Section 3.6, the
marginal cost of domestic water supply is estimated. The application of Ramsey pricing and
development of a new tariff structure is presented in Section 3.7. The methodology section
concludes with a presentation of the welfare impact of the new tariff in Section 3.8.
3. 1 Problem statement
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate whether a tariff based on Ramsey pricing
principles results in an increase in welfare for the domestic water consumers in Durban. The
specific objectives of the research were:
• Establish the water demand characteristics of domestic households in Durban.
• Estimate the demand function and associated demand price elasticity of low, middle
and high income households.
". Estimate the marginal cbst of domestic water supply.
• Propose an increasing block tariff based on Ramsey pricing principles.
• Compare the impact on welfare of the proposed tariff against that of the current tariff
by measuring the change in consumer surplus.
• Present the findings and make recommendations to the Durban city council regarding
the application of Ramsey pricing principles in setting water tariffs.
The proposed tariff structure presented in Figure 3.1 consisted of blocks that were targeted at
specific income levels, low income, middle income and high income households. The
increasing block tariff structure fulfilled the requirement of the government's free basic water
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policy and provided the first 6 kL per month free. A second block was priced to address the
needs of poor consumers. The price of the third block and fourth blocks were set at a price
which included a mark-up according to the end users ability to pay. The final block was set at


















Figure 3.1: Structure of proposed increasing block tariff
The low income block is set at or just above the short run marginal cost of providing an
additional kilolitre of water to a consumer. The price of each of the subsequent blocks is set·
according to the consumer groups willingness to pay. The penalty tariff is set at twice the
calculated high income block tariff. One of the underlying purposes of this research is to
determine an appropriate difference between the price of the tariff blocks that will maximise
welfare distribution.
3.2 Recent history of water services in Durban
In 1992 the Durban City Council was restructured to form separate business units that would
focus on the effective delivery of services. The Durban Water and Waste service unit was
formed to provide water, waste water and solid waste services. The finances of the water
department were ring fenced to ensure that revenue from water sales met the costs of
providing water services. The water supply tariff was based on a two part tariff structure, a
fixed charge and a consumptive charge. The· same consumption charge was applied to both
domestic and non-domestic consumers.
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The Durban Metropolitan Municipality was formed in 1995. Durban Metro Water Services
was created by amalgamating 43 separate water utilities and municipalities into one
operational entity. The main purpose of the single body was to provide equal services to all
citizens across the metro at the same tariff. The former black townships had received
particularly poor water services in the past and cost recovery was negligible.
In 1996 the water losses in the former townships were between 60 and 80%. The pipe network
was constructed in a mid-block layout making it particularly difficult to maintain, read meters,
and police illegal connections. The billing database was also completely out of date. A large
capital investment programme was started whereby new reticulation was laid in the road
verges, meters installed and consumer details captured into the billing database. House to
house visits were carried out informing and educating owners on the process of metering, bill
payments and disconnections. By the end of 1998 most of the consumers in Umlazi andKwa
Mashu were being billed for water. It .took another six months before these new consumers
had adjusted their consumption to levels they could afford.
From 1993, water supply in the informal settlements was through a bailiff operated standpipe
or prepaid ground tank system. The ground tank system consisted of a 200 litre tank at each
dwelling which was filled once a day by a bailiff through a small reticulation network
connected to the municipal water supply. By 1996 it was clear that the cost of collecting
revenue from the prepaid tank system exceeded the cost of the water being supplied. A
decision was taken to provide the tank system water supply at a zero tariff. The 200 litre tank
effectively provided each household with 6 kL free water per month.
An increasing block tariff was first introduced for domestic consumers in 1996 with a penalty
tariff for consumption exceeding 30 kL per month. A lower tariff was introduced in 1997 for
consumption less than 6 kL per month. In 1998 this first block of 6 kL was provided free.
This addressed the equity issue raised with free water only being made available to informal
settlement households. Poor unemployed people did not only live in informal settlements,
those poor people living in fomial township houses also had the right to basic water services.
The development of the increasing block tariff and change in real prices between 1996 and
2003 is shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Change in real (base 2000) domestic water tariff between 1995 and 2003
showing the development of the increasing block tariff.
In 1997 the Umgeni Water Board notified the Durban Metro that it would need to construct a
major catchment transfer scheme to ensure water resources for the future at the current growth
rate in demand. This capital expenditure was to have a significant impact on the water tariff
and was politically unacceptable and economically unsustainable. A demand management
strategy was developed that would see water demand stay constant over· the next 10 years.
The stepped tariff, waste water recycling and water loss management systems put in place
have actually dropped demand to 1994 levels. Figure 3.3 shows the change in bulk water
demand between 1988 and 2003 for the Durban and surrounding area now administered by
the eThekwini Municipality. This reduction in demand was attained while at the same time
























Figure 3.3: Water demand in Durban between 1988 and 2003 (Nicoll, 2003). (a water
conservation strategy introduced in 1997)
During the run up to the 2000 local government elections, politicians placed a moratorium on
disconnections in the former black townships. While certain politicians may have gained
some support through this move, for many households it placed them in a debt trap. Without
the threat of disconnections, these poor households spent their little money on other
necessities. When the moratorium was lifted 12 months later, these poor households were
faced with water bills they could not afford to pay. This led to a series of disconnections,
meter tampering, connection removals and the installation of illegal connections. This resulted
in an unprecedented loss of revenue and for the first time ever, the water department collected
insufficient revenue to cover its costs. Political interference continues to hinder efforts to
revive a culture of well-behaved consumers in the townships and the water arrears situation
continues to deteriorate.
Finally, the water and waste services department is being restructured in 2003 under the
eThekwini Municipality (formed in 2000), gaining efficiencies by finding synergies with
other municipal departments and removing duplicated functions.
3.3 Characteristics of the eThekwini Municipality
The Greater Durban Metropolitan Area is administered by the eThekwini Municipality
(www.durban.gov.za). According to the Census 2001 statistics, there are approximately
3.1 million people living within the eThekwini Municipality boundary (StatsSA, 2003b).
There are approximately 60 000 households living in the rural areas, 150 000 households
living in informal peri-urban settlements, and 560 000 families live in formal residential
housing units (StatsSA, 2003b).
The municipality' purchases treated potable water in bulk from the Umgeni Water Board
(www.umgeni.co.za) and distributes it to all domestic and non domestic water users in its area
of jurisdiction.
Details of the formal water consumers in Durban were obtained from the mu?icipality's water
account billing database. Table 3.1 gives a breakdown of the consumer types and
consumption in 2003.
Table 3.1: Summary of consumer types
Consumer type Connections Consumption
(No.) (%) (kUd) (%)
Domestic 336939 95.5 327487 52.3
Institutional 731 0.2 11 105 1.8
Commercial 12655 3.6 209 129 33.4
Industrial 2477 0.7 78533 12.5
Total 352802 100.0 626256 100.0
It is clear that domestic consumers form a significant proportion of the customer base. On the
other hand non-domestic consumers only form 4.5% of the customers but account for 47% of
sales.
Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of domestic consumer types and service level as at 7 April
2003. Consumer types are divided between single residential properties and cluster, or
multiple dwelling properties. The consumer types are also differentiated between a normal
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unlimited supply and a limited supply (by means of a flow restricting device on the meter
installation). Service levels are divided between normal full pressure connections and semi
pressure or roof tank supply. Service levels are also differentiated between connections which
are currently in service or disconnected.
Table 3.2: Breakdown of domestic consumer type and service level
Single Residential Multi Residential
Normal Limited Normal Limited Total
Full Pressure 307144
In service 228035 4864 34552 2
Disconnected 37216 1 083 1 388 4
Semi Pressure 29795
In service 24441 197 1 0
Disconnected 5 115 41 0 0
Total 294807 6185 35941 6 336939
It is clear from Table 3.2 that full pressure single residential connections made up the vast
majority (80%) of domestic water connections. The research sample was drawn from this
segment of the consumer database. Consumers who were disconnected in April 2003, or
whose consumption was artificially limited by a flow restricting device were excluded from
the sample as they were not well behaved consumers. An analysis of their consumption would
not reflect their true willingness to pay for the water consumed.
3.4 Selection of low, middle and high income groups
The first step in finding a sample of low, middle and high-income consumers was to find a
means of differentiating consumers according to income. As household income micro data
were not available, the property value, as determined by the municipal property valuation roll,
was used as a proxy for income. Although the municipal property valuation roll (of April
2003) did not represent the market value of each property, it did provide a consistent
indication ofthe relative difference in income between households across the municipality.
The property valuation roll identified 291 900 properties as single residential units (this
excluded cluster housing complexes, flats etc.) of which 300 had a value above R1.2 million.
These 300 properties were excluded from the analysis since it was felt that it was unlikely,
from the property description, that these properties were used as normal residences. At the
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lower end of the market all properties that had either a land value or building value of less
than RI 000 were eliminated in order to exclude undeveloped properties. The lowest property
value was then R3 500, which from the description appeared to be a valid residential property.
The remaining 291 600 properties were then ordered according to property value and split
into three equal proportions, representing the low income, middle income and high income
households. The breakpoint for low income was all properties valued at less than R56 000.
The breakpoint for high-income households was all properties above Rl54 400. All properties
in between these two breakpoints were classed as middle income.
The property records were then joined with the billing records to flag individual consumer
records as high, middle or low-income consumers. Unfortunately only 70% of consumer
records could be joined to the valuation role database. This was because 30% of the billing
records had been captured on a separate database which did not have a field to link it to the
property valuation database. It was however still possible to obtain representative samples of
each income group from the joined records.
3.5 Identifying well behaved consumers
It was only possible to determine a consumer's price elasticity of water demand if they were
actually paying for the water they were consuming. Households who had fallen behind with
bill payments, or stopped paying, were obviously using more water than they wished to pay
for. Including these consumers in the analysis would have given skewed results regarding
their change in consumption with changes in price. It was necessary to only select well-
behaved consumers. This was done by eliminating all consumers whose arrears (in April
2003) exceeded the cost of three months of their average consumption. This did not exclude
consumers who had at some stage, during the analysis period, fallen behind with payments.
The assumption was made that these consumers were still managing their demand despite
financial difficulties, and had rehabilitated themselves as soon as financially possible.
Previous research on low income household water payment strategies had found that
consumers still tried to manage their demand despite being slightly in arrears. It was only
when their arrears rose to a level that they could not afford to settle in the long run that they
grew despondent and stopped managing their demand (van Vuuren, 2003, pg 92).
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3.6 Cleaning the data
It was necessary to ensure that the samples selected for each income group did not consist of
corrupt data. While every effort had been made by the billing department to ensure the
integrity of its data it was not possible to eliminate all data capture errors. One example of a
data capture error would be where a non-domestic consumer was incorrectly classified as
domestic. This problem was eliminated by only selecting billing records where the consumer
was classified as domestic in the water billing system and as residential in the town planning
system.
A potentially more serious error was the incorrect capture of meter readings in the billing
system database. It was generally accepted that the billing verification process eliminated
these errors by flagging readings that fell outside an acceptable variation of the average
reading and resulted in the meter reading being checked. According to the billing records
some monthly meter readings were estimated. This generally happened 0:ver the December
holiday period, but could also have happened for a number of other reasons, including the
meter reader not being able to find the meter box, due for example, it being covered by a pile
of building material. This meant that the reading for that month was estimated based on the
average consumption over the previous 12 months. From a statistical point of view this would
not have changed the sample statistics significantly, however it was decided to eliminate
consumer records where more than two readings had been estimated during any 12 month
period.
Another concern with meter readings was where a consumer had experienced a burst or
serious leak in their internal plumbing. The meter reading would have reflected high
consumption, however this consumption did not represent what the consumer was willing to
pay for water, thus defeating the objective of the analysis. This situation was handled by
looking at records where the peak consumption in any particular month exceeds three times
the average consumption for the year. These consumers were then excluded from the analysis.
A difficult situation to deal with was the incidence of shack farming, especially in the former
black townships,. A domestic consumer in a residential area could rent out back yard shacks
to poor households. The water consumption of all the households was then reflected on the
meter reading of the single residential property. This problem was ignored in the analysis.
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Shack farming was a phenomenon created by the apartheid system by restricting black people
from living outside of defined black townships. With the repeal of these laws, many
households moved out of backyard shacks and into informal settlements closer to work
opportunities in the city.
The final check was to plot the monthly average, variance and standard variation of each
consumer group. Any significant deviation from the average was then investigated to isolate
the records generating the anomaly. In one such plot of the average monthly consumption for
each consumer group we found that the consumption of the low-income households exceeded
that of the middle-income households at the end of 1998. At first this could not be explained.
The sample variance and standard deviation plots for the same period clearly showed some
form of an anomaly present during the last three months of the year. A plot of the number of
consumer accounts in the sample also showed a sudden increase during the same period for
low-income households. Looking at individual records it became clear that the great majority
were from the former black townships ofUmlazi and Kwa Mashu and Ntuzuma.
Before 1998 consumers in these areas were charged a flat rate for water irrespective of their
consumption. During 1997 and 1998 meters were installed and the consumers were registered
in the billing database. The billing data showed that these consumers were using a lot more
water when the meters were first read. These same households adjusted their water demand
over the next six months so that it fell in line with what other low-income consumers were
using and paying for. This clearly demonstrated the impact of billing on water demand and
deserves further study. However it distorted the data since the consumers were obviously
using more water than they were willing to pay for. The impact on the data was corrected by
ignoring these new consumers billing records for the first six months that they were
connected. This gave them time to adjust their household water demand to an amount they
could afford.
The outcome of this cleaning exercise was a set of consumer records that truly reflected
individual households willingness to pay for water services. This was then the clean
population from which the sample was drawn
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3.7 Statistical analysis of the billing data
A cross section of 5 000 consumers was selected from each income group from the clean
population (in April 2003). The monthly billing records for each consumer in the sample were
then extracted from the billing system archives. At least 1 263 records were required for each
consumer group in order to estimate the average consumption for the month with the 99%
confidence required (Appendix AI).
Many consumers, especially in the lower income groups had only been captured onto the
billing system since 1988. This meant that for the low income consumers, the sample had less
than 1000 consumers prior to June 1988. However the estimated mean consumption even for
this smaller sample size was still within 1.2 kL per month of the true mean (at a 99%
confidence level).
The sample of billing records was processed to determine the mean, median, variance and
standard deviation of monthly and annual consumption of the three income groups. A 99%
confidence interval was calculated for each estimate of average monthly consumption. A
'summary report of the average monthly water consumption of each of the income groups
during each financial year (July to June) is gIven In Table 3.3. The full results of the
statistical analysis are given in Appendix A2.
Table 3.3: Average monthly water demand of low, middle, high and all income groups
Low Middle High All
Income Income Income Income
Financial Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Year (kUmth) (kUmth) (kUmth) (kUmth) (kUmth) (kLlmth) (kLlmth) (kUmth)
1996/1997 20.9 18.3 23.8 21.0 34.7 29.1 28.4 23.7
1997/1998 20.4 18.0 23.2 20.4 34.1 28.8 28.0 23.4
1998/1999 19.2 16.5 23.2 20.7 34.9 30.0 27.3 22.8
1999/2000 18.3 15.3 22.9 20.7 34.5 30.0 25.1 21.0
2000/2001 16.5 14.1 22.4 20.4 33.9 29.4 24.1 20.4
2001/2002 15.7 13.5 21.7 19.8 32.8 28.2 23.3 19.8
2002/2003 15.2 12.9 21.6 19.8 32.6 28.2 22.9 19.5
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The confidence interval for the annual mean demand is generally better than 0.5 kL/month.
For the monthly mean demand this confidence interval is generally better than I kL/month.
Figure 3.4 shows a plot of how average household water demand had changed during the
study period. Higher income groups used more water than lower income groups. There had
been a general downward trend in water consumption over the period for all income groups.
The lower income groups had reduced their demand more than the higher income groups. The
trend of low income households was also less variable than middle or high income groups.
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Figure 3.4: Graph indicating the change in monthly average household water
consumption between 1997 and 2003 for low, middle and high income group samples
(n ::::: 4000 records per group per month)
A frequency distribution of the annual mean monthly demand was generated from the sample
data. The full results are presented in Appendix B. It is interesting to note the differences in
frequency distribution between the three different income groups in 2002/2003 (Figure 3.5).
The distribution for low income consumers is highly skewed to the left, while the distribution
of high income consumers is more symmetrical. Taken together, the frequency distribution
and summary of mean and median demands allows the following obs.ervations. The modal
demand oflow income households was about 9 kL per month, and 50% used less than 13 kL,
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whilst the average demand was 15 kL per month. The median and average consumpti'on of
middle income households was 19 and 22 kL per month respectively. High income
households used 33 kL per month on average, and 50% used more than 28 kL per month.
These observations are important for making decisions on the appropriate size of the pro-poor
and other tariff blocks.
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Figure 3.5: Frequency distribution of water consumption for low, middle and high
income groups in 200212003 (n::::: 12 000).
3.8 Regression analysis
Regression analysisinvestigates the impact that various factors may have on household water
demand. Billings and lones (1996, pg 4) suggested that population, economic cycles,
technology, weather and climate, price and conservation programmes may all have a
significant impact on water demand over time. These factors were each considered and treated
as follows:
• Population: This research was concerned with the change in water demand in an
average household over time. According to the national census, between 1996 and
2001, the average household size in eThekwini dropped from 4.1 0 to 4.00 (StatsSA,
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2003a, StatsSA, 2003b). This may have been due to the impact of HIV/AIDS, but is
much more likely to be due to the delivery oflow cost housing. For the purpose of this
research it was not practical to determine the change of household size for each
property in the sample. It was assumed that the average household size of the sample
had remained constant overall and that any reduction in one household was offset by
additions in another.
• Economic cycles affect commercial and industrial water demand more than domestic
demand. There is however an impact on the household in terms of the income
available to spend on water as apposed to other goods. It was assumed that by
adjusting the nominal tariff by the Consumer Price Index (StatsSA, 2003c), it was
possible to simulate the impact of economic cycles on the average household in that
real tariff growth resulted in a reduction in spending on other goods and services
unless water consumption is reduced.
• Water efficient technologies do have an impact on water demand as households
replace inefficient appliances over time. Investments in efficient technology was not
considered to be a factor in determining water demand but rather a result of pressure
from increasing water price and conservation programmes.
• Weather and climate: A clear seasonal trend in average water household consumption
was observed in Figure 3.4. Monthly rainfall and temperature data, available from the
South African Weather Services for Durban, were used in the regression analysis to
explain changes in water demand (Swart, 2003).
• Price: One of the primary objectives of the regression analysis was to determine the
impact that changes in the water tariff over time had on water demand. The actual
tariffs were adjusted by the consumer price index to give a real price based on year
2000 value
• Water conservation programmes: No new or changed water restrictions had been
applied during the study period. Households who had fallen into arrears were
encouraged by the water department to attend water conservation education
programmes to assist them in managing their water demand. All households who were
more than three months in arrears were excluded from the sample as they did not
represent well behaved consumers.
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3.8.1. Developing the regression model
The first step in developing the regression model was to plot the data in order to detect
relationships which could be explained with a mathematical function. Water consumption was
plotted against real price, temperature and rainfall. These relationships are shown in
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Relationship between average monthly demand and real marginal price
(base 2000) for low, middle and high income groups.
In Figure 3.6 the average monthly demand over a financial year (July to June) has been
plotted against the corresponding real tariff for the period. The average demand for middle
and low income groups has been plotted against the real tariff for the 6 to 30 kL block while
the average demand for high income groups has been plotted against the real tariff for both
the 6 to 30 kL/mth block (High 1) and the greater than 30 kL/mth block (High 2). The mean
consumption for high income households falls above the 30kL/mth mark but the median
consumption falls below 30kL/mth. It was not clear which price high income households were
responding to, A clear relationship between increasing price (or tariff) and decreasing
household water demand or consumption was observed for all income groups. This
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relationship was more significant in lower income levels in comparison with higher income
levels. This relationship could be described by a linear function but would probably be better
described by a logarithmic function.
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between average monthly water demand and average monthly
maximum temperature for January to December (1996 to 2003) for low, middle and
high income groups.
In Figure 3.7 the average monthly maXImum temperature has been plotted against the
average demand for the corresponding month between 1996 and 2003. There appears to be a
relationship between increasing temperature and increasing water demand. This relationship
was more positive for lower income groups than higher income groups. The relationship was
far more variable for the high income group in comparison with middle and low income
households. A linear or increasing logarithmic function could be used to describe the
relationship.
In Figure 3.8, the average monthly rainfall between 1996 and 2003 was plotted against the
average monthly water consumption during the same period. There appeared to be a similar
relationship between rainfall and demand as was seen between temperature and demand. It
was expected that demand would decrease as rainfall increases. The observed relationship was
probably due to a high correlation between rainfall and temperature. The regression analysis
would test the significance of these explanatory variables and if necessary, rainfall would be
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dropped as it appeared to be far more variable than temperature In its relationship with
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Figure 3.8: Relationship between average monthly demand and average monthly
rainfall for January to December (1996 to 2003) for low, middle and high income
groups.
A regression model was proposed based on the observations of the relationships between
water demand and price, temperature and rainfall. Both a linear and a logarithmic function
were proposed to test the relationship between demand and the three explanatory variables.
The linear function found the sum of the impact of the three variables while the logarithmic
function found the product of the three explanatory variables. The best function would then be
selected based on the results of the regression analysis.
Q= B + Bl x Price + B2 x Temp + B3 x Rain (3-1)
(3-2)
Where
Q = monthly household water consumption (kL/mth)
B and C = constant or intercept of models
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BI, B2, B3 and Cl, C2, C3 are the slope coefficients of their respective explanatory
variables.
Taking the natural logarithms of each side of (3-2) yielded:
In (Q) = In(C) + C/ln(Price) + C2In(Temp) + C3In(Rain) (3-3)
The demand function represented by both Equations (3-1) and (3-3) are linear and the
coefficients could be estimated using ordinary linear regression methods. An attractive feature
of the model given in Equation (3-3) was that the slope coefficient Cl measured the elasticity
of demand in respect to price, that is the percentage change in demand for a given percentage
change in price. Using Equation (3-1) the arc elasticity would need to be calculated over the
range of price and demand.
3.8.2. Analysing the regression model
The average monthly water consumption for each of the income groups was regressed against
the real marginal tariff (base 2000 price), average monthly maximum temperature and average
monthly rainfall for the corresponding metering period between July 1996 and June 2003
(84 months). The full table of data used in the regression analysis is presented in Appendix C.
Table 3.4 summarises the most important statistics of each regression.
The initial runs for both the linear and log linear models consisted of marginal pnce,
temperature and rainfall data for each income group. The results of these regressions were
analysed to see if any variables were insignificant. The critical value for· a 95% confidence
level and 83 degrees of freedom was that any variable with an absolute t statistic of less than
2.04 should be dropped from the model. It was found that in the models of the high and
middle income groups, the impact of the rainfall variable was insignificant. In the low income
models the rainfall variable was marginally significant. Similarly the t statistic for temperature
showed that while it remained significant for middle and low income models, it was only
marginally significant in the high income model. These findings led to further models being
developed which only included temperature and price, or price on its own. Price was
significant in all the models produced, being most significant in lower income models.
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The significance of the regression models as a whole was checked by ensuring that the
F statistic was greater than the critical F value for a 95% level of confidence. In all cases it
was found that the regression model is significantly better in explaining water demand than
would be achieved by just using the mean demand value found for the analysis period.
Table 3.4: Summary of regression model statistics
Model Form Variables Adjusted R Standard F
sguare error statistic
High income Log-linear Price >30kL/mth, 0.176 0.042 6.9
temp and rain
Log-linear Price 6-30kLlmth, 0.254 0.040 10.5
temp and rain
Linear Price>30kLlmth, 0.216 1.363 8.6
temp and rain
Linear Price 6-30kLlmth, 0.267 1.318 11.1
temp and rain
Log-linear Price >30kL/mth and 0.184 0.041 10.4
temp
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth and 0.262 0.039 15.7
temp
Linear Price >30kL/mth and 0.225 1.355 13.0
temp
Linear Price 6-30kL/mth and 0.275 1.31 16.7
temp
Log-linear Price >30kL/mth 0.139 0.042 14.4
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth 0.215 0.041 23.8
Linear Price >30kL/mth 0.177 1.397 18.8
Linear Price ·6-30kL/mth 0.229 1.352 25.6
Middle Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth, 0.743 0.009 81.2
income temp and rain
Linear Price 6-30kL/mth, 0.747 0.460 82.7
temp and rain
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth and 0.745 0.020 122.8
temp
Linear Price 6-30kLlmth and 0.750 0.457 125.2
temp
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Model Form Variables Adjusted R Standard F
square error statistic
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth 0.546 0.027 100.9
Lin Price 6-30kL/mth 0.558 0.608 105.6
Low income Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth, 0.869 0.050 184.4
temp and rain
Linear Price 6-30kL/mth, 0.811 1.114 119.4
temp and rain
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth and 0.858 0.052 252.2
temp
Linear Price 6-30kL/mth and 0.784 1.188 151.9
temp
Log-linear Price 6-30kL/mth 0.829 0.057 404.2
Linear Price 6-30kL/mth 0.765 1.240 271.4
The final test of significance was with the adjusted R2 values. The models with the highest R2
value were the most significant. In the case of the high income households the linear model
that incorporated both marginal price (6-30kL/mth) and temperature was most significant,
explaining 28% of the variability in water demand. The log-linear model with the same
variable gave very similar results. Price (6-30kL/mth) on its own explained 23% of the
variability using the linear model or 22% using the log-linear model. The models using
the>3OkL/mth tariff as one of the explanatory variables could not explain more than 23% of
the variability in demand. This is probably due to the fact that the median consumption of the
high income group was less than 30 kL a month. The low explanatory power of the models
for high income households may not have been very satisfactory, but was not unexpected
considering the weak relationships observed in the graphs between water demand and the
explanatory variables.
The models for middle income households using price and temperature was able to explain
75% of the variability in water demand with the explanatory power of the linear model being
slightly better than the log-linear model. Price on its own accounted for 56% of variability in
demand. Finally the log-linear models for low income households using price, temperature
and rainfall successfully predicted 87% of the changes in demand. Once again the impact of
price was significant, accounting for 83% of the variability in demand.
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The most significant demand functions for both the linear and log linear regression models are
presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Estimated linear and log-linear demand functions for low, middle and high














Q = 23.75 -3.07 x Price + 0.13 x Temp + 0.006 x Rain
Q = e269 x Price-o.s5 x Tempo.24 x Raino.o l
Q = 20.98 -1.02 x Price + 0.19 x Temp
Q = e257 x Price-0 14 x Tempo 22
Q = 32.92 -1.10 x Price + 0.17 x Temp
Q = e3.22 x Price-olo x Tempo. I3
Note that it is possible to estimate demand in terms of price only by substituting the average
annual monthly maximum temperature (25.5 QC) and the average annual monthly rainfall
(91.5 mm) into the above funCtions.
3.9 Price elasticity of water demand
The price coefficient found in the log linear regression model gave a direct estimate of the
price elasticity of water demand. The price elasticity of demand could also be calculated with
the linear regression model by multiplying the price coefficient by the average real price
divided by the average demand The estimates of price elasticity found using the most
significant regression models are summarised in Table 3.6 together with the applicable 95%
confidence interval.
3-21
Table 3.6: Estimated real price elasticity of water demand for low, middle and high
income groups.
Income Form Price elasticity 95% lower 95% upper
Group of demand bound bound
Low Log-linear -0.55 -0.50 -0.60
Linear -0.52 -0.46 -0.58
Middle Log-linear -0.14 -0.12 -0.16
Linear -0.14 -0.12 -0.16
High Log-linear -0.10 -0.06 -0.14
Linear· " -0.10 -0.06 -0.14
There was no difference in the value of the price elasticity of demand between the linear or
log-linear models for the middle and high income groups. For the low income group there was
a slight difference. The price elasticity found using the log-linear model was assumed to be
better estimate since the log-linear model performed marginally better than the linear model in
the regression analysis.
3.10 Marginal cost of water
An important input into the Ramsey pricing formula was the marginal cost of the service.
Determining the marginal cost of the water service is a subject of debate on its own. For the
purposes of demonstrating the application of Ramsey pricing, it was assumed that the short
run variable cost of providing water services in Durban was an acceptable approximation of
the marginal cost of water. The annual financial statements of the ring-fenced water services
department were used to determine the variable cost. The main cost components of water
services during the" previous 3 financial years are provided in Table 3.7 (eThekwini
Municipality, 2002, pg 293-295, eThekwini Municipality, 2001, pg 294-299). The costs were
roughly assigned to annual fixed cost per consumer, annual fixed cost per kL, and annual
variable cost per kL. The fixed cost per consumer accounted for the cost of metering, billing,
and customer services. The fixed cost per kL accounted for planning, construction and
maintenance of water supply infrastructure, and the variable cost per kL accounted for the
cost of purchasing and distributing treated water to consumers.
3-22
Table 3.7: Annual fixed and variable cost components of eThekwini Water Services
between 1999 and 2002.
Ave%
2001/2002 2000/2001 1999/2000 of Total
Description (R'OOO) (R'OOO) (R'OOO) (%)
Per consumer
Fixed Costs
Salaries and Wages 110479 103654 78721 12
General expenses 159581 155682 177 135 19
Contributions* 23477 21 917 17760 2
Recoveries** -96 156 -112605 -132687 -13
Total 197380 168648 140929 20
Per kL supplied
Fixed costs
Capital Charges 153505 141 361 122201 16
Repairs and Maintenance 43651 48374 43232 5
Sub Total 197 156 189734 165433 22
Variable costs
Water Purchases 549915 470370 432411 57
Chemicals and Electricity 7488 6068 6660 1
Sub Total 557402 476438 439072 58
Total 754558 666172 604505 80
Grand Total 951 939 834820 745434 100
Note* Contributions reflect the cost of finance and human resources support provided by other council
departments.
Note** Recoveries reflect the cost of plant, labour and materials accounted for under salaries and wages and
general expenses which were also charged against capital projects and the repair and maintenance of
infrastructure.
If the water service provider was to charge consumers according to the actual cost incurred in
serving the consumer then it is clear from Table 3.7 that 20% of total cost must be distributed
evenly among all consumers as a fixed charge, 22% should be a fixed charge assigned to
consumers pro rata to their average demand as the cost of providing the infrastructure
necessary to meet this demand, and the remaining 58% of costs must be recovered through a
consumption tariff. Table 3.8 illustrates such a tariff structure using data from Table 3.7 for
the 2001/2002 financial year.
3-23
Table 3.8: Calculation of fixed and variable costs associated with full cost recovery for
the 200112002 financial year.
Description
Total fixed costs (R'OOO)
Total fixed cost (R'OOO)




Fixed cost per consumer connection (R/mth)
Fixed cost per kL demand (R/mth)
Variable cost per kL Purchases (R/kL)












Notice that in Table 3.8 the variable costs have been calculated using both the quantity
purchased (i.e. the quantity purchased from Umgeni Water) and sold (i.e. the quantity sold to
consumers). The difference between the two is the cost of non-revenue water. This non-
revenue water (30% of purchases) is a cost incurred by the service provider due to
background losses (approximately 10% of water in pipes is lost through leaks which cannot
be economically repaired) and inefficiencies in reducing water loss by repairing major leaks,
eliminating illegal connections, and maintaining metering systems.
The short run marginal cost of supply would be approximately equal to the variable costs of
supplying an additional kL of water. From Table 3.7 the variable cost was made up of bulk
water purchases (99%) and chemicals and electricity (1 %) It is clear that the bulk water tariff
for water purchased from the Umgeni Water Board is a fair approximation of the short run
marginal cost of water supply in Durban.
In the long run all costs can be considered to be variable. Fixed costs will vary according to
the number of consumers in the system and the additional infrastructure required for water
distribution. The cost per consumer and the cost per kL of water distributed will remain fairly
constant in real terms during the long term. For the purposes of setting tariffs, the cost per
customer and the cost per kL of water distribution infrastructure could still be considered to
be a fixed cost in the long run. Increasing variable costs will be mainly a function of the
increasing diseconomies of scale associated with tapping water resources further away from
the point of use. These costs will be reflected in the bulk water charges from Umgeni Water.
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In 2002 the Umgeni Water Board changed its tariff methodology to ensure a constant tar~ff in
real terms over the long term. The tariff model was based on the long term cash flows
required to meet the demand for additional water resource development, rather than balancing
levels of expenditure during anyone financial year. The organisations debt level would
increase during the initial period and then decrease as net cash flows become positive
(Umgeni Water, 2002, pg 29). It was therefore assumed that for Durban, the bulk water tariff
was a good approximation of their long term marginal cost.
3.11 Application of Ramsey pricing
The purpose of this dissertation was to apply the Ramsey Pricing formula to determine a pro-
poor tariff structure for Durban. The inputs required were the marginal cost of supply and the
price elasticities of demand for each of the consumer groups. In order to calculate and propose
a tariff it was also necessary to establish appropriate block sizes and state a revenue
requirement.
3.11.1. Setting the block size
Setting the block size has traditionally been the function of the political authorities. The
policy was to ensure that the poor have access to affordable water services while the rich pay
a premium to cross subsidise the consumption of low income groups. In practice the size of
the pro-poor block has often been set too large, covering all low income demands as well as
most of the high income demands. The water service provider has then found it difficult to
raise sufficient revenue without setting a relatively high tariff for this pro-poor block.
In order to guide decision makers in their deliberations this research has considered the
following three options:
• Old tariff: The existing tariff structure for 2002/2003 was used with the first block of
6 kL/month supplied free of charge. The second block extended to 30 kL/month. The
penalty block started from 30 kLlmonth. A fixed charge was levied at 6 kLlmonth and
at 12 kLlmonth
• New tariff 1: The first block was set at 6 kL/month. The limit of the pro-poor block
was set at a quantity that ensures that it accommodates the. demand of at least 50% of
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the low income household group. The step from pro-poor block to the next block was
set 12 kL/month, approximately equal to the median demand of low income
households in 2002/2003. The steps in subsequent blocks were also set approximately
equal to the median demand of the middle and high income household groups; at 18
and 27 kL/month respectfully. The penalty block started at 27 kL/month. Fixed
charges were levied at 6 kL, 12 kL and 18 kL per month.
• New tariff 2: The first block was set at 6 kL/month. The end of the pro-poor block
was set at 15 kL/month, approximately equal to the average demand of low income
households. The next step for the middle income group was set at 21 kL/month. The
step for high income households was set at 30 kL per month rather than the average
demand of 33 kL/month. This was to preserve the demand management impact of the
existing penalty tariff starting at 30 kL/month. Fixed charges were levied at 6 kL,
15 kL and 21 kL per month.
The accumulated frequency distribution shown in Figure 3.9 guided the setting of these
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Figure 3.9: The accumulated frequency distribution of the low, middle and high income
groups in 200212003.
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Table 3.9: Proposed block structures showing the proportion and accumulated
proportion of consumers from the low, middle and high income households in
each block
Tariff Proportion consumers Accumulated proportion consumer
(kLlmth) (%) (%)
Low Middle High Total Low Middle High Total
OLD TARIFF
0> :56 22 8 3 11 22 8 3 11
6> :512 29 19 8 18 51 26 11 29
12> :530 42 57 48 49 94 83 59 78
>30 6 17 41 22 100 100 100 100
NEW TARIFF 1
0> :56 22 8 3 11 22 8 3 11
6> :512 29 19 8 18 51 26 11 29
12> :518 23 23 15 20 74 50 26 50
18> :527 17 28 26 24 91 78 51 73
>27 9 23 49 27 100 100 100 100
NEW TARIFF 2
0> :56 22 8 3 11 22 8 3 11
6> :515 41 30 14 29 64 38 17 40
15> :521 18 22 16 19 81 60 34 58
21> :530 12 23 25 20 94 83 59 78
>30 6 17 41 22 100 100 100 100
Table 3.9 shows the proportion of consumers from each income group who use water within
each tariff block of the proposed tariffs. It can be seen that approximately 50% of consumers
from each income group use less water than the limit of their respective tariff blocks for the
proposed new tariff 1 structure. Similarly approximately 60% of each income group use less
water than the limit of their tariff blocks in the proposed new tariff 2 structure.
The table also shows the proportion of consumers in each income group who spill over into
tariff blocks not specifically designed for their income level. It can be seen that increasing the
size of each block would include a greater proportion of the target group that the block was
designed for, as well as a greater proportion of higher income households.
3.11.2. Determining a revenue requirement
A water service provider would generally determine a revenue requirement by modelling the
consumption of its consumers. The revenue from sales must equal the C?st of sales. A simple
model would forecast sales to be the current sales plus a percentage growth. In most cases the
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consumers would be segmented into different classes, i.e. domestic, institutional, commercial
and industrial. The model of sales to domestic consumers may be as simple as average
domestic consumption times the number of domestic consumers. More advanced models
would segment domestic consumers into income brackets, apply a frequency distribution of
monthly bills and possibly apply the price elasticity of demand in calculating the impact on
revenue due to tariff changes.
A model of domestic consumers was created for this dissertation to simulate the impact of a
proposed tariff change. The domestic consumers were segmented into low, middle and high
income groups, with a frequency distribution of monthly bills as determined by the sample of
real consumers analysed in Section 3.7. It was assumed that the revenue generated by the
model consumers using the applicable tariffs from 2002/2003 would cover the costs of
delivering water services to these consumers during 2002/2003. With this assumption it was
then possible to calculate a revenue requirement for the Ramsey pricing tariff and compare
the revenue generated by the old tariff with the revenue generated by the new (Ramsey
pricing) tariffs. The model consisted of approximately 3 000 well behaved low, middle and
high income households, each group consisting of 1 000 consumers.
3.11.3. Application of the Ramsey pricing formula
The revenue of the water service provider is equal to the sum of bills paid by the individual
consumers. Each bill is the sum of kilolitres consumed in each block at the block tariff plus
any fixed charges.
The size of each tariff block was assumed as described in Section 3.11.1, and the number of
consumers in each increment of consumption was determined from the frequency distribution
of monthly bills for the domestic consumers of Durban. The unknown variables that needed to
be calculated were the price of each tariff block and fixed charges applied at each step.
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These prices were calculated using the Ramsey pricing formula:
Where:
M = P; -C,
I P
/
Pi = price of /h tariff block
C = marginal cost of /h tariff block
Ci = price elasticity of demand of /h tariff block
Since the marginal cost of water was assumed to be the Umgeni Water bulk tariff
Cl = Cz = C3 = R2.28.
From Table 3.5, the price elasticity of demand for the income groups is:
C/ = price elasticity of low income group = -0.55,
C2 = price elasticity of middle income group = -0.14,
C3 = price elasticity of high income group = -0.10.
The required prices PI, Pz and P3 were found by an iterative process of:
1. Estimating a value for PI
2. Calculating Pz and P3 using the Ramsey pricing formula
3. Substituting these values into the block tariff structure
4. Calculating the value of a bill for each increment of consumption
5. Multiplying the value of bill for each consumption increment by the number of
consumers in that consumption increment
6. Adding all the revenues for each consumption increment to determine the revenue
from sales.
7. Comparing the revenue received using the estimated tariff prices with the revenue
requirement
8. Adjusting the estimated value of PI and recalculating the revenue received until it
meets the revenue requirement.
The above procedure was carried out using a spreadsheet.
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Fixed charges were determined by a similar procedure to the consumptive charges calculation.
In this analysis it was assumed that a fixed charge will apply on entering each new tariff
block. Fixed charges are used to cover the cost of providing the service connection to each
consumer irrespective of consumption. They are an important source of revenue for the
service provider as it provides a certain level of guaranteed revenue to cover the short run
fixed cost of providing the service. Fixed charges are often regressive in that they make up a
larger proportion of the total bill for low income households than for higher income
households. The Ramsey pricing methodology was applied in setting the fixed charges for
each block. However it should be noted that in the case of consumptive charges, the short run
marginal cost of the service was the floor above which the price for the low income block was
set. In the case of the fixed charges, the actual cost of the service connection was relatively
high for low income households and the actual difference in cost in serving low income
households against high income households did not reflect the differences in income
distribution. In order to ensure that the fixed charges were affordable, they were set artificially
low for the first block (approximately equal to the existing fixed charge for the first block),
and Ramsey pricing was used to determine fixed charges for each higher block. This ensured
that fixed charges related to households affordability and willingness to pay, with higher
income groups subsidizing the access costs for lower income households
The calculated new tariff structures are presented with the old tariff structure in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Old and new tariff structures calculated using Ramsey prices.
Variable charges Fixed charges
Tariff Old New New Old New New
Block tariff tariff 1 tariff 2 tariff tariff 1 tariff 2
(kL) (R/kL) (RikL) (RikL) (R) (R) (R)
0>::; 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
6> ::; 12 4.57 2.54 2.57 24.94 21.83 22.07
12>::;15 4.57 3.81 2.57 35.69 29.82 22.07
15>::;18 4.57 3.81 4.10 35.69 29.82 31.67
18>::;21 4.57 5.22 4.10 35.69 37.11 31.67
21 >::;27 4.57 5.22 6.01 35.69 37.11 41.31
27>::; 30 4.57 10.44 6.01 35.69 37.11 41.31
>30 9.14 10.44 12.02 35.69 37.11 41.31
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Table 3.10 shows that making the pro-poor block larger forces the price for each subsequent
block to be higher. This was expected.
The new tariff structures were used to calculate the cost of the monthly water bill according to
the consumption increment. This was compared to the existing tariff structure and the cost of
providing the service in Figure 3.10. The fixed cost component of the service was based on a
fixed cost of R46.62 per connection plus Rl.08 per kL for a 30kL/monthfconsumer design
capacity of the water supply infrastructure. The variable cost was based on the Umgeni Water
bulk tariff and did not take into account non revenue water due to leaks, illegal connections
and faulty meters.
It can be observed in Figure 3.10 that all consumers who use less than 27 kL/month benefited
from the new tariff structures. This represented 78% of all consumers. It was also clear that
the average bill for those consumers who used between 12 and 18 kL/month would drop
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Figure 3.10: Graph showing the change in average bill using the new tariffs as against
the old tariff for 2002/2003.
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Figure 3.10 also showed that using both the old and new tariffs, the water service provider
did not recover the costs of the service from those consumers using less than 27 kL/month.
The tariff above 30 kL/month resulted in over recovery, ensuring that overall full cost
recovery was achieved. Apart from providing water at a lower cost to households who kept
their consumption low, it was also clear that the new tariff structures had a greater under
recovery and over recovery than the existing tariff. Table 3.11 presents the change in revenue
received from the different income groups using each of the tariff structures. Less revenue
was received from both the low and middle income groups with the new tariff structures. The
high income groups provided the cross subsidisation. Note that in all cases the high income
groups provided more than 50% of the revenue
Table 3.11: Change in revenue received from each income group with respect to the
tariff structure.
Revenue from each income group
Low Middle High Total
(R/mth) (R/mth) (R/mth) (R/mth)
Old tariff 70421 111 329 189483 371233
New tariff 1 62076 107 153 202033 371 262
New tariff 2 61566 105721 203968 371 255
Table 3.12: Change in revenue received from each consumption bracket in respect to the
tariff structure.
Revenue from each tariff block
Consumption Old tariff New tariff 1 New tariff 2
bracket (kL/mth) (R/mth) (R/mth) (R/mth)
0> :S6 0 0 0
6>:s 15 48705 34901 35388
15>:S21 54651 42583 43582
21 >:S30 78 163 77900 73851
30> 189715 215879 218435
Total 371 233 371262 371 255
Table 3.12 shows in which consumption bracket the revenue was raised. The new tariff
structures generate less revenue from the lower consumption brackets than the higher brackets
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In all cases the revenue generated from sales above 30 kL/month exceeded 50% of all
revenue.
3.12 Welfare impact of the new tariff
The literature on Ramsey pricing suggests that using Ramsey pricing to determine the price of
water leads to an optimal welfare distribution effect. Welfare being measured by the
consumer surplus; the difference between what a consumer is prepared to pay and what the
consumer actually pays.
A model using only three average consumers was adopted to calculate the consumer surplus.
It was assumed that all low income households have the same demand curve as the average
low income household. The same was assumed for middle and high income households. The
demand curve for each consumer was described using the linear regression function estimated
for each consumer group in Section 3.8. This together with the old and new tariffs is























Figure 3.11: Consumer demand curves for low, middle and high income households
plotted with the marginal price of water for the old and new tariffs
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Note that the consumer demand curve had only been estimated using linear regression for real
(year 2000) prices between R2.15 and R4.31. The slope of the curve outside of this range is
not known, but has been extrapolated as a straight line so that the consumer surplus can be
calculated.
The consumer surplus was calculated for each of the three consumers using the new tariffs
and then compared to the consumer surplus found using the old tariff. The results of these
calculations are presented in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13: Change in consumer surplus for each income group using the new tariff.
Middle
Low income Income High income Combined
consumer consumer consumer consumer
surplus surplus surplus surplus
Old Tariff (Rand/mth) 78.33 301.54 471.92 851.79
New tariff 1 (Rand/mth) 91.11 315.95 481.32 888.38
Change + 12.78 +14.41 +9.40 +36.59
Change (%) +16.3% +4.8% +2.0% +4.3%
New tariff 2 (Rand/mth) 95.00 322.39 487.07 904.45
Change + 16.67 +20.85 +15.15 +52.66
Change (%) 21.3% 6.9% 3.2% 6.2%
A surprising but not unexpected observation is that all average consumers benefited from the
change to the new tariff structures. The low income households benefited proportionately
more than the higher income groups, but even high income households experienced an
increase in consumer surplus. In absolute tenns, the middle income group experienced the
highest increase in welfare
How is it possible that all three consumers benefited from the new tariff structures? Who was
paying for the benefits enjoyed by all? The simplicity of the three consumer model hides the
distribution of individual household consumption. Table 3.14 shows the actual volumes of
water sold in each consumption bracket per consumer group.
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Table 3.14: Water sales in consumption brackets by consumer group.
Consumption Low income Middle income High income Total Total
Bracket household household household household
consumption consumption consumption consumption
(kL/mth) (kL/mth) (kL/mth) (kL/mth) (kL/mth) (%)
0>S6 8454 8850 8937 26241 6.2
6> S 15 21741 29457 33375 84573 20.0
15>S21 11976 21819 30531 64326 15.2
21 > S 30 10758 24507 46077 81342 19.3
30> 8400 27285 130332 166017 39.3
Total 61329 111918 249252 422499 100.0
Total (%) 14.5 26.5 59.0 100.0
From Table 3.14 it is evident that water purchases in the bracket that exceeds 30 kL per
month made up 39 % of all sales. These purchases were made at the penalty tariff. This major
contribution to cross subsidisation is not revealed with the simple three consumer model. The
new tariff structures lower the price for consumption less than 30 kL per month and increase
the tariff for consumption greater than 30 kL per month.
Another observation from Table 3.14 is that the low income households purchased only
14.5 % of total water sales. The high income group purchased 59 % of all water sales. More
than 50% of the high income household water purchases were at the penalty tariff. Less than
15 % of the low income households water purchases were at the penalty tariff.
This may be challenged as being unfair as it placed an unjustifiable burden on high income
households. In defence it must be clearly understood that the tariff schedule is applied
equitably for all consumers. A high income household could derive the same benefit available
to a low income household by using less water. If a high income household chooses to use
more water than the average high income consumer then this is because the household
believes the value derived from the additional water exceeds the cost, even if this cost
includes subsidising lower income households. This is the underlying principle of Ramsey
pricing, tax those who are most tolerant of price increases and most able to afford the higher
pnce.
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3.13 Financial and environmental impact of the new tariff
The same three average consumer model used to determine the welfare impact of the new
tariffs was also used to investigate the financial and environmental impact of the new tariffs.
Table 3.15 and Table 3.16 show the change in demand and the change in revenue with the
new tariff structures for each of the three consumer groups.
Table 3.15: Change in demand with the new tariffs for average low, middle and high
income consumers.
Water Demand Low Middle High
Income Income Income Combined
consumer consumer consumer consumer
demand demand demand demand
Old Tariff (kL/mth) 15.2 21.6 32.6 69.4
New tariff 1 (kL/mth) 17.9 21.4 27.8 67.1
Change (kL/mth) +2.7 -0.2 -4.8 -2.3
Change (%) +18.1 -0.8 -14.8 -3.3
New tariff 2 (kL/mth) 17.2 20.7 30.0 67.9
Change (kL/mth) +2.0 -0.9 -2.6 -1.5
Change (%) +13.2 -4.2 -8.0 -2.2
Table 3.16: Change in revenue with the new tariffs for average low, middle and high
Income consumers.
Low Middle High Combined
Income Income Income consumer
consumer consumer consumer revenue
revenue revenue revenue
Old Tariff (R/mth) 77.73 106.98 169.13 353.85
New tariff 1 (R/mth) 67.54 92.96 114.88 275.38
Change (R/mth) -10.20 -14.02 -54.25 -78.47
Change (%) -13.1 -13.1 -32.1 -22.2
New tariff 2 (R/mth) 63.18 78.17 95.05 236.40
Change (R/mth) -14.55 -28.81 -74.08 -117.45
Change (%) -18.7 -26.9 -43.8 -33.2
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The same infonnation presented in Table 3.15 can be obtained by observing the supply and
demand curves in Figure 3.10. With the new tariff, low income households would increase
their consumption and pay less for their monthly water account. Middle income households
would reduce their consumption slightly and pay a lot less for water. High income households
would reduce their consumption significantly and pay significantly less for water. Overall, for
the average consumer, the water service provider would experience a 2 to 3 % drop m
demand and between 20 and 30 % drop in revenue using one of the new tariff structures.
The small overall reduction in water demand usmg the new tariffs had a positive
environmental conservation impact. The increase in consumption by low income households
could be considered to be a negative impact, however since the low income households are
responsible for only 14 % of total demand, this increase will have a negligible impact overall,
but a major positive impact in tenns of personal and community health.
The reduction in revenue generated by the new tariffs presents a warning to the water service
provider and explains the increase in welfare calculated for the three consumer model. It must
be reiterated that the simplicity of the 3 consumer model hides the total cross subsidisation
impact of the new tariffs. However the water service provider would clearly be more
vulnerable to a reduction in average consumer demand with the new tariffs in comparison
with the old. A decision to move to the Ramsey pricing tariff structure should only be taken
once the service provider is confident with the calculated price elasticity of demand and has




This dissertation set out to detennine if Ramsey pricing could be used by the Durban water
services department to set affordable and welfare maximising water tariffs. The process
required a detailed analysis and understanding of the domestic consumers behaviour when
faced with changes in the price of water. This process had in itself made a number of useful
findings which need to be noted. This included the statistical properties of the consumer
population, the frequency distribution of monthly water demand and the price elasticity of
water demand.
The cost of providing water services was an important component of the tariff setting process.
This research did not do a detailed analysis of the issues involved, but made certain
assumptions regarding marginal costs that were used in detennining the proposed tariffs. Two
tariff structures were detennined using Ramsey pricing principles and compared with the
current tariff schedule used by the water service provider. The change in Marshillian welfare
between the existing and proposed tariff structures was computed with a simple three
consumer model using the average demand functions of three different income groups. The
economic and environmental impact of the proposed tariffs were also modelled using the
simple three consumer model.
This Chapter of the dissertation presents the findings of each objective addressed in the
research. Section 4.1 presents the water demand characteristics of domestic consumers in
Durban. In Section 4.2, the estimate of the demand function and associated demand price
elasticity of low, middle and high income households is presented. Section 4.3 presents an
estimate of the marginal cost of domestic water supply. Two increasing block tariffs based on
Ramsey pricing principles are proposed in Section 4.4. The impact on welfare of the proposed
tariffs is compared against that of the current tariff by measuring the change in consumer
surplus in Section 4.5.The financial and environmental impact of the proposed tariffs are also
compared.
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4.1 Water demand characteristics of domestic consumers In
Durban
The entire population of 352 000 water consumers supplied by the eThekwini Municipality
was segmented into domestic and non-domestic consumers. The domestic consumers were
further segmented into single residential or cluster dwelling properties, full pressure and semi-
pressure consumers. The full pressure single residential consumers were segmented into those
who had unrestricted supply and restricted supply. The unrestricted full pressure domestic
consumers, who make up 65% of the entire population of water consumers, were then
differentiated by their current level of arrears. A sample of 15000 consumers, representing
one third low income, one third middle income and one third high income households was
drawn from this population of consumers who were less than three months in arrears with
their bill payments. This sample represented well behaved consumers who, through their
consumption and payment history, had revealed their willingness to pay for water at different
prices between 1996 and 2003. The billing history of the sample consumers was extracted
from more than 25 million records. 850 000 observations of monthly water consumption were
analysed in the research.
Statistical analysis of the sample showed· that there were significant differences in average
water demand between the 3 consumer groups (Table 4.1). It was also found that in all cases
the average demand for water had dropped during the study period. The largest reduction in
demand had been in the lowest income group. This suggested that low income groups were
most sensitive to real price increases experienced between 1996 and 2003.
Table 4.1: Water demand statistics of the three income groups
Statistic Low Middle High
income income income
Average demand 2002/2003 (kL/month) 15.2 21.6 32.6
Change in average demand between 1996 and 2003 (%) -27 -9 -6
Median demand 2002/2003(kL/month) 12.9 19.8 28.2
Change in median demand between 1996 and 2003 (%) -30 -6 -3
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A frequency distribution of monthly water demand was extracted from the data. The
frequency distributions showed that while there were obvious differences in the means and
medians of each group, there were also significant overlaps in demand (Figure 4.1). When
compared year on year, the frequency distributions of the low income group also showed a
significant movement towards lower consumption. The same trend was not as evident in the
annual frequency distributions of the higher income groups. See Appendix B for details of
frequency distribution trends.
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of water demand for low, middle and high income
groups in 2002/2003 (n :::::: 4000 consumers per group).
4.2 Estimate of the demand function and associated price
elasticity of demand
An essential input into the Ramsey pricing formula is the corresponding price elasticities of
demand for each product being taxed. In this case each tariff block was assumed to be a
different product, targeted at a different income group. The observed long run price elasticity
of water demand for each income group was then used as a proxy for the price elasticity of
demand for the targeted tariff block of that income group. A number of regression models
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were developed to explain changes in monthly water demand with respect to changes in price,
temperature and rainfall. In all cases price was the major explanatory variable, with
temperature making a minor contribution and rainfall none at all. Both linear and log linear
models were developed and tested, with similar results. The most descriptive demand
functions of low, middle and high income household water demand are presented in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Estimated linear and log-linear demand functions for low, middle and high








linear Q = 23.75 -3.07 x Price + 0.13 x Temp + 0.006 x Rain
log-linear Q = e2.69 x Price-o.55 x Tempo.24 x Raino.o 1
linear Q = 20.98 -1.02 x Price + 0.19 x Temp
log-linear Q = e2.57 x Price-O. 14 x Tempo.22
linear Q = 32.92 -1.10 x Price + 0.17 x Temp









Q = monthly water demand (kL/month).
Price = real water tariff (indexed on year 2000 rand value) for the 6 to 30 kL/mth tariff
block (R).
Temp = average maXimum air temperature during calendar month at Durban
International Airport (CO).
Rain = total rainfall during calendar month at Durban International Airport (mm)
Both the linear and log-linear demand functions give similar results for estimates of demand
within the historical price range between R 2.15 and R 4.31 per kL (year 2000 value). The
linear model, being simpler, was used in all the graphical presentations of the consumer
demand function.
The estimates of price elasticity for the income groups are presented in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Estimated price elasticity of water demand for low, middle and high income
groups.
Income Price elasticity 95% lower 95% upper
group of demand bound bound
Low -0.55 -0.50 -0.60
Middle -0.14 -0.12 -0.16
High -0.10 -0.06 -0.14
Both the linear and log linear models of water demand provided similar estimates for the price
elasticity of demand. There was a small difference between the elasticities estimated for low
income households. The elasticity estimated using the log linear model was adopted because
the log linear model performed better in terms of its statistical properties. The 95% confidence
interval calculated for each of the estimates is quite narrow with. very little overlap. This
indicates that there is a significant difference in the price elasticity of water demand between
the three income groups and that the elasticity is significantly different from O.
4.3 Marginal costs of domestic water supply
The marginal cost of producing a product is used in the Ramsey pricing formula to set the
price of the good. The marginal cost is the floor price, all products are sold at a markup above
this price. The annual financial statements of the municipal water department and its bulk
water supplier were analysed to determine the appropriate marginal cost of supply. A full
analysis of the factors impacting on the marginal cost of supplying one additional kilolitre of
water to a consumer was beyond the scope of this report. It was assumed that since most of
the water supplied in Durban is gravity fed and does not require additional chemical dosing,
the bulk water tariff of Umgeni Water would be a very good estimate of the short run
marginal cost of water supply. The bulk water tariff was R2.28 during the 2002/2003 financial
year.
Using the bulk water tariff as the price floor ensured that all consumers pay at least the cost of
each additional kilolitre of water purchased from the bulk supplier to meet their demand. The
fixed overhead costs of the municipal water service provider and the cost of unaccounted for
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water were met by the price markup on higher consumption level blocks and the incrementing
fixed charges levied on higher consumption levels.
4.4 Ramsey pricing tariff structure
An increasing block tariff structure consists of tariff block sizes and tariff block prices.
Ramsey pricing calculates the welfare maximizing block price for a given block size.
Maximum welfare is dependant on the block sizes which are inputs into the Rarnsey pricing
formula. The selection of the welfare maximizing block sizes was not dealt with in this
research. This will remain a political decision for now. It was decided to propose and compare
two different block structures in order to guide the decision makers in their deliberations over
the most appropriate block sizes.
The frequency distribution was used to guide the selection of appropriate tariff block sizes.
The considerable overlap in demand by consumers in different income groups made the
selection of block sizes that targeted specific income groups difficult. The design of the first
proposed tariff structure ended the targeted block at the mean consumption of the targeted
income group. The design of the second tariff structure ended the targeted block at the
average consumption of the targeted income group. The average consumption was generally
10 to 20 % higher than the mean. The first six kL per month were provided free as required by
goverrunent regulation, and a penalty block was added after the targeted high income block
(Figure 4.2). The objective of the penalty tariff was to discourage the wasteful or luxury
consumption of water by charging the full economic, social and environmental cost of such
luxury consumption and to provide revenue for the cross subsidization of lower income
households. The penalty tariff was set at twice the tariff for high income households. An
accurate estimate of the full economic, social, environmental and opportunity cost of the
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Figure 4.2: Proposed block structures considering the mean and average consumption of
low, middle and high income groups
With fixed tariff block sizes, the tariff block prices would depend on a revenue target. A
revenue target for the Ramsey pricing tariff schedule was determined by applying the actual
tariff schedule for 200212003 to a theoretical model of domestic consumers. One thousand
consumers were allocated to each income group, with the same frequency distribution of
monthly water demand found for the sample of real consumers. The revenue generated using
the old tariff was then used as a revenue target for the new tariffs. The calculated price
elasticity of water demand for each income group and the short run marginal cost of supply
were substituted into the Ramsey pricing formula to fmd a price setting for each tariff block.
The new price schedule was then applied to the theoretical model of consumers to find the
revenue generated by the tariff schedule. By adjusting the mark-up percentage of the Ramsey
formula it was possible to increase or decrease the revenue received until the target was met.
This process led to the tariff schedules and bill charges described and compared with the old
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Figure 4.3: Graph showing the change in water bill charges with increasing demand
using the old and new tariffs.
Figure 4.3 shows that a substantial portion of consumers, especially in the low and middle
income households using between 12 and 18 kL/month would be charged almost 30% less for
their water consumption. Households consuming higher volumes of water would pay for the
benefits of the lower consuming households. The negatively affected households would either
continue to use large amounts of water because they could afford to and believed the benefits
they derived from the consumption exceeded the higher costs, or they would reduce their
consumption to levels where they would also benefit from the new tariff. The observed price
elasticity of demand of the high income households suggested that these households would
not reduce their consumption by more than 1% for every 10% that the price was increased.
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Figure 4.4: Graph showing the change in revenue received from each block with the
three tariff schedules
Figure 4.4 shows that in comparison with the old tariff, the two new tariffs collect less
revenue from the tariff blocks less than 30 kL per month and a higher amount of revenue from
sales greater than 30 kL per month. The revenue received from consumption greater than
30 kL per month is more than 50% of all the revenue received. The total revenue received
from all the tariff schedules is the same.
4.5 Welfare impact of the proposed tariff
One of the primary objectives of using Ramsey pricing was to achieve an optimum welfare
distribution with the new water tariff. Welfare being measured by the consumer surplus, the
difference between what a consumer is prepared to pay and what the consumer actually pays.
The observed consumer demand schedule for each income group was assumed to represent
what the consumer was willing to pay. The tariff schedule was what the consumer actually
paid for each increment of consumption. The area in between the two curves was calculated
for both the old and new tariffs for each income group. Figure 4.5 shows the consumer
demand schedules for low, middle and high income households and the marginal prices for
the old and new tariff structures. Table 4.4 shows the result of these calculations and the
change in consumer surplus due to the change in tariff structures.
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Table 4.4: Change in consumer surplus for each income group using the new tariff.
Middle
Low income mcome High income Combined
consumer consumer consumer consumer
surplus surplus surplus surplus
Old Tariff (Rand/mth) 78.33 301.54 471.92 851.79
New tariff 1 (Rand/mth) 91.11 315.95 481.32 888.38
Change + 12.78 +14.41 +9.40 +36.59
Change (%) +16.3% +4.8% +2.0% +4.3%
New tariff 2 (Rand/mth) 95.00 322.39 487.07 904.45
Change + 16.67 +20.85 +15.15 +52.66
Change (%) +21.3% +6.9% +3.2% +6.2%
The most significant feature of the new tariffs was that the consumer surplus increased for all
income groups. This confirmed the theory that Ramsey pricing can lead' to an increase in
welfare distribution. Both the proposed new tariffs resulted in a pareto improvement over the
old tariff as they increased the welfare of the low income group without reducing the welfare
of any other group. The proposed new tariff 2 was a pareto improvement over the proposed
new tariff 1 for the same reason. It cannot be stated that either of the proposed tariffs was the
pareto efficient tariff. This can only be determined by measuring the consumer surplus arising
from a range of changes in both the block size and price of the tariff blocks. In this research
only the price was manipulated using Ramsey pricing. Intuition rather than any optimisation
process fixed the different block sizes. The development of a model which optimises the
block sizes would be highly recommended. The tariffs developed using the assumed block
























Figure 4.5: Consumer demand curves for low, middle and high income households
plotted with the marginal price of water for the old and new tariff structures
Figure 4.5 shows the consumer demand curves and the proposed new tariff structures. It also
shows that setting a larger pro-poor block pushes the price up for all subsequent blocks.
Setting the size of the blocks too small results in the average consumer in any particular
income group using more water than the targeted block for that consumer group. It is clear
that the solution to the problem of setting the price of tariff blocks targeted at specific income
groups would require multiple iterations of setting block sizes, fmding the tariffs that
generated the revenue required, and then calculating the resulting consumer surplus. The
optimal solution would be the one that maximizes the consumer surplus, or welfare, of the
consumers.
The same three consumer model used to determine the welfare impact of the new tariff was
also used to investigate the financial and environmental impact of the new tariff. The results
can be observed graphically in Figure 4.5. With the new tariffs, low income households
would increase their consumption by while paying less for their monthly water account.
Middle income households will reduce their consumption and pay less for water. High income
households would also reduce their consumption and pay less at the end of the month. Overall
the water service provider would experience a 2 to 3% drop in demand and between 20 and
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30 % drop in revenue from the average consumer using the new tariff structure. The loss in
revenue will be made up by sales at the penalty tariff to households that exceed 30 kL per
month.
In summary;
• New tariff 2, designed using a larger pro-poor block, resulted in 2 % greater consumer
welfare than new tariff 1, designed with a smaller pro-poor blocks, and a 6 % increase
in welfare over the old tariff. Both tariffs presented an improvement, but new tariff 2
would be recommended from a social welfare perspective.
• New tariff 1 resulted in a 3.3 % drop in water demand in comparison with the old
tariff, and was 1 % point lower than new tariff 2. Both tariffs present an improvement,
but new tariff 1 would be recommended from a water conservation perspective
• New tariff 2 resulted in a 33 % drop in sales revenue from consumers using less than
30 kL per month. New tariff 1 resulted in a 22 % drop in revenue from the same
consumers. This drop in revenue has to be made up from higher sales revenue from
consumers using more than 30 kL per month. Both tariffs place the service providers
revenue stream at risk. New tariff 1 would be preferred from a risk averse perspective.
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5 Conclusions
The conclusion to this research considers the following questions:
• Does Ramsey pricing address the objectives of setting water tariffs? (Section 5.1)
• What risks does Ramsey pricing introduce? (Section 5.2)
• Should Ramsey pricing be used in Durban? (Section 5.3)
A final comment is made in Section 5.4 where the findings of the research are evaluated in
terms of economic theory and previous research.
5. 1 The objectives of setting water tariffs
The increasing block tariff structures developed in this dissertation with Ramsey pricing
principles addressed the main objective~ of tariff setting for both officials and politicians.
• The proposed new tariffs raised the same revenue as the old tariff, thus addressing the
issue of revenue sufficiency.
• The research has shown that high income households use more water than low income
households. The proposed tariff structures redistribute income by charging low prices
for lower consumption and higher prices for higher consumption
• The tariff structures could be applied equitably across all domestic consumers. Both
low and high income households would be charged the same amount if their
consumption was the same.
• Each step in the increasing block tariff structures discourages the unnecessary luxury
use of water. With informative billing users would respond accordingly, promoting
resource conservation and the sustainable use of water.
• The final block of each new tariff was arbitrarily set at twice the tariff of the high
income block to encourage water conservation. With more information, this could be
set at the full environmental cost of developing water resources ensuring the economic
efficiency of the tariff for volumes in excess of reasonable domestic consumption.
• The proposed tariff structures are relatively simple, requiring only minor changes to
the existing increasing block tariff to implement
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• The proposed tariff structures are also completely transparent. There are no significant
legal, administrative or technical issues that would prevent its implementation.
All these objectives are quantifiable and could be achieved with the current increasing block
tariff. Applying Ramsey pricing in the increasing block tariff design addressed the subjective
issue of fairness. It would be difficult for someone to argue that the proposed tariff was unfair
if the tariff design was based on what households were willing to pay as revealed by their
historical water purchases. The research has shown that implementing the proposed tariff
would result in an improvement in welfare for 75% of all con~umers. The tariff could
therefore be easily defended, ensuring its public acceptability and political support.
5.2 The risks of Ramsey pricing
Revenue stability is probably the most important issue to be considered before introducing the
proposed tariff structure. In Figure 4.3 it was shown that for both the old and new tariffs, the
bills for consumption below 28 kL/month recovered less revenue than the cost of the water
supplied. The new tariffs recovered less than the old tariff for these low levels of
consumption. This places the water service provider at a greater risk of under recovery with
the new tariffs. The figure also showed that the new tariffs recovered more than the cost of the
service for consumption greater than 30 kL/month. A decision to implement the new tariffs
can only be made with confidence if the decision makers are certain that sufficient revenue
will be received from consumers using more than 30 kL/month to cover the costs of the under
recovery.
The research found that setting the size of the pro-poor block at either the mean or the average
consumption for low income households made little impact on total welfare. It did find that
using smaller block sizes had more impact on water conservation and presented less risk of
insufficient revenue being collected. A larger pro-poor block raised the price of the pro-poor
block and subsequent blocks. The larger pro-poor block had less conservation impact and
presented a greater risk of under recovery.
The Ramsey pricing methodology is not complex but needs good estimates of the pnce.
elasticity of water demand for different target groups. The Ramsey pricing formula is more
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sensitive to the ratio between the price elasticities rather than the absolute values. This will
allow some flexibility in the methodology adopted for calculating price elasticities. The long
run price elasticity of water demand was estimated for this research. The short run price
elasticity is known to be less elastic for essential goods. A financial model based on long run
price elasticities could result in over recovery in the short term. The financial model used in
this research was based on the frequency distribution of 3 000 consumers and ignored the
price elasticity of demand. The tariffs calculated in this research will have to be reviewed with
a model that takes price elasticity into account before being implemented.
A reasonable estimate of the short run marginal cost of supply is required as this sets the price
floor above which the low income or pro-poor tariff must be set. Municipalities that can lower
their short run marginal cost can offer lower pro-poor tariffs than municipalities that are tied
into a single bulk water supplier like a regional water board. Durban should discuss the
restructuring of the bulk water tariff with Umgeni Water. Introducing a two part bulk water
supply tariff structure will allow the municipality to offer a lower first block tariff to poor
households.
The price elasticity of water demand was estimated for three consumer groups based on the
lowest third, middle third and highest third of rateable property values. The financial model
assumed there were equal numbers of consumers in each group. This was true for the
2002/2003 financial year but will change with time. Between 10 and 15 thousand low cost
houses are planned to be built each year in the eThekwini Municipality over the next ten
years. This will increase the number of low income households and their proportion of all
water consumers. The financial model will have to accommodate the proportional change in
low, middle and high income consumers to remain accurate in forecasting water demand and
revenue generated by water sales.
5.3 Ramsey pricing for Durban
Like all municipalities in South Africa, the officials of Durban are under constant pressure to
improve service delivery, extend services to previously un-served communities, and ensure
that services remain affordable and sustainabl.e. The price set for water services impacts on all
these issues. Sufficient revenue must be raised through the sale of water to maintain and
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Improve the quality and quantity of water supplied to eXIstmg consumers. Capital loans
required for the installation of infrastructure necessary to serve previously unserved
communities must be redeemed through future water sales to new consumers. Newly
connected consumers must be able to afford the benefits of a piped municipal water supply.
Setting the pnce of water services involves negotiation between the officials who are
primarily concerned with recovering the cost of services, and the elected politicians who are
concerned with reaching previously disadvantaged communities with water services that are
affordable. Designing an appropriate increasing block tariff structure is not a simple task.
There are many variable that need to be set; the number of blocks, the size of each block and
the price of each block. Many combinations of blocks and prices can result in a desired
revenue target being achieved. It is in all parties interest that a tariff structure is negotiated
that will maximise consumer welfare, ensure sufficient revenue is collected to cover the cost
of the service, and ensure that water use is efficient and sustainable.
The findings of this research have supported the theory that calculating water tariffs using
Ramsey pricing principles can meet revenue requirements and lead to a better distribution of
welfare for the municipalities' consumers. Adopting the principle of Ramsey pricing to
differentiate the price of blocks will, like the principle of an increasing block tariff structure,
allow politicians and officials to focus on more subjective issues during tariff setting
negotiations, like setting the size and price of the pro-poor block
The findings of this dissertation could provide decision makers with the confidence needed to
take decisions on changing the tariff structure. The consumer demand functions, price
elasticity of demand, and frequency distribution of monthly bills should be built into a model
that will accurately simulate the change in revenue received due to consumers change in
demand with respect to changing price.
The tariffs calculated in this research are not necessarily the optimum welfare-distributing
tariffs for Durban. However the tariffs developed using Ramsey pricing have proven to be
better than the current tariff from the point of view of welfare distribution. The management
of the water services department should consider applying the Ramsey pricing principles
during the next round of tariff calculations. The obvious welfare distribution effects· will
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appeal to the political leadership and make a significant impact on making domestic water
supply more affordable for poor households.
5.4 Economic theory
The results of the research were expected in terms of modem economic theory. The mean and
average water demands, as well as the frequency distribution of water demand found for the
different income groups were consistent with the theory of supply and demand. Low income
households purchased less water than higher income households. The estimated price
elasticity of water demand for the three income groups, as determined by the observed
behaviour of the water consumers, supports the theory that purchases that consume a larger
portion of income are more price elastic than purchases that consume a smaller portion of
Income.
It is surprising that similar results are not found in the literature. Most research into the price
elasticity of demand has taken place in the USA and Europe. Researchers have struggled to
find significant differences in the price elasticities of water demand between different income
groups. This has been attributed to the fact that the price of water makes up an insignificant
proportion of a households budget (Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1988, pg 10). The major
differences in price elasticity have been found between inside and outside water use. Inside
water has been found to be less elastic in comparison with outside, or low value luxury use
(Veck and Bill, 2000, pg 5.9). This has led to the incorrect assumption that because high
income households use more water outdoors, the price elasticity of water demand for a high
income household will be higher than that for a lower income household (Moilanen and
Schulz, 2002, pg 361, Boland and Whittington, 2000, pg 228). Low income households are
assumed to be limited by how much water they can save in the event of price increases.
The research carried out for this dissertation has demonstrated quite clearly that in the case of
developing countries with high income differentials, the price elasticity of water demand is
significantly higher for low income households in comparison with higher income
households. This can be attributed to the fact that with limited budgets and many competing
essential goods, if the price of water goes up, consumption must come down or the poor
households budget will not balance. An economic reality in the developing world.
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6 Recommendations
This dissertation found that usmg Ramsey pncmg principles in setting the price of
consumption blocks of water tariff could lead to an improvement in consumer welfare. The
research also found that changing the size of the tariff blocks resulted in a trade-off between
social, environmental and economic objectives. The findings were based on the output of
simple consumer models. It was established that the simple consumer models accounted for
either the cross subsidisation effect, or the price elasticity of demand effect, but not both
simultaneously. The models could solve for a welfare maximising block price based on a
given block size, but could not solve for both the welfare maximising block size and price.
This dissertation has laid the foundation for a welfare maxImIsmg tariff model to be
developed with Ramsey pricing principles. The Appendices contain summaries of real
consumer billing data that could be used to test the model and its impact on welfare. A model
should be developed that can use different price elasticities of water demand, frequency
distributions of demand, proportion of low, middle and high income households, and marginal
price of water supply as input. Additional constraints must be optional, such as the size of a
free basic water block, pro-poor block and the price of a peI,lalty tariff.
The development of a model must take into account the work already done in developing
water tariff models, especially the Water Supply Services Model (WRC, 1998) and the Free
Basic Water Services Planning Model (DWAF, 2002), both developed by the Palmer
Development Group and available for download on the internet. The model could be a stand-
alone model used with input from the Water Supply Services Model, which focuses of
investments required for addressing the services backlog, and provide outputs which are used
in the Free Basic Water Services Planning Model. Alternatively, the· principles of Ramsey
pricing could be incorporated into the existing Free Basic Water Services Planning Model
which takes into account all consumers, not just formal residential consumers as was dealt
with in this dissertation.
It is highly recommended that the foundation laid by this dissertation is used to develop a
tariff model based on Ramsey pricing principles for water service providers in South Africa.
The model could be piloted in Durban using the data contained in the appendixes and then
evaluated to determine its applicability in other municipalities.
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Appendix A: Sample statistics
A.I Determining the sample size
The sample size was selected to achieve a desired precision in the estimated statistic (Billings
and lones, 1996, p160). A larger sample would give a more accurate estimate. The sample
size was also dependant on the variability of the data observations. If a variable had a high
standard deviation then a larger sample was needed to achieve similar statistical accuracy in
comparison with a variable with a smaller standard deviation. Walpole and Meyers (1978,
pg 197) provided the following formula for determining the number of observations needed to
provide the desired degree of accuracy:
Where:
n = sample size
e = maximum error
Za/2 = Z number corresponding to al2 level of confidence
(J = standard deviation
The research was considering how the average water consumption of low, middle and high
income households had decreased over time with increases in tariff. The statistic required was
the mean daily consumption during each billing period.
A random sample of 10 000 domestic consumer records was drawn from the database for the
month of April 2003, and the standard deviation of the monthly water consumption values
was determined. The results are given in table Al
Table AI: Statistics for a random sample of 10 000 domestic consumers.
N Minimum Maximum Mean
(No.) (kUd) (kUd) (kUd)




A sample was required that would allow the analysis to be 99% confident that the true mean
statistic fell within 0.05 kL/d of the estimated mean.
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The formula was used with the following variables:
ZO/2 = 2.575 (for ex = 0.005 Z = 2.575 => 99% confidence)
(J = 0.69
e = 0.05
results in the sample size required being:
N = [(2.575 X 0.69)/0.05]2 = 1 263 records
Therefore a nurumum sample of I 263 records was required to calculate the mean
consumption for a group with the desired level of accuracy.
A. random sample of 5000 consumer records was selected from the population for each
income group. To ensure the sample represented well behaved domestic consumers, the
sample was selected from the population of consumers who were less than 3 months in
arrears, had unlimited access to full pressure water supply, were registered domestic water
consumers, and lived on a property zoned as single residential.
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A.2 Annual and monthly statistics of residential water demand
Table A2: Annual statistics of HIGH Income residential water demand
Meter Std Sample 99% Cont.
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
1996/1997 34.7 29.1 18.0 23.2 25249 0.38
1997/1998 34.1 28.8 17.1 22.7 45392 0.27
1998/1999 34.9 30.0 16.7 22.4 45315 0.27
1999/2000 34.5 30.0 16.3 22.1 46137 0.27
2000/2001 33.9 29.4 14.6 20.9 46249 0.25
2001/2002 32.8 28.2 13.7 20.2 46227 0.24
2002/2003 32.6 28.2 13.5 20.1 45579 0.24
Table A3: Annual statistics of MIDDLE Income residential water demand
Meter Std Sample 99% Cont.
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
1996/1997 23.8 21.0 7.4 14.9 23226 0.25
1997/1998 23.2 20.4 6.7 14.1 40097 0.18
1998/1999 23.2 20.7 . 6.3 13.7 41906 0.17
1999/2000 22.9 20.7 6.0 13.5 48203 0.16
2000/2001 22.4 20.4 5.5 12.9 48710 0.15
2001/2002 21.7 19.8 5.0 12.3 48831 0.14
2002/2003 21.6 19.8 5.2 12.5 47484 0.15
Table A4: Annual statistics of LOW Income residential water demand
Meter Std Sample 99% Cont.
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
1996/1997 20.9 18.3 6.1 13.5 6675 0.43
1997/1998 20.4 18.0 5.7 13.0 11636 0.31
1998/1999 19.2 16.5 5.6 13.0 21816 0.23
1999/2000 18.3 15.3 5.7 13.1 48247 0.15
2000/2001 16.5 14.1 4.2 11.2 48381 0.13
2001/2002 15.7 13.5 3.8 10.7 48248 0.13
2002/2003 15.2 12.9 3.6 10.4 48320 0.12
Table AS: Annual statistics of ALL Income residential water demand
Meter Std Sample 99% Cont.
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
1996/1997 28.4 23.7 13.2 19.9 55150 0.22
1997/1998 28.0 23.4 140.3 64.9 97125 0.54
1998/1999 27.3 22.8 42.9 35.9 109037 0.28
1999/2000 25.1 21.0 69.5 45.7 142587 0.31
2000/2001 24.1 20.4 59.4 42.2 143340 0.29
2001/2002 23.3 19.8 55.4 40.7 143306 0.28
2002/2003 22.9 19.5 64.2 43.9 141383 0.30
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Table A6
Monthly statistics for high income residential water demand
99%
Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
Jul-96 35.1 0.9 0.5 0.7 211 0.12
Aug-96 31.3 26.7 14.1 20.6 2492 1.06
Sep-96 38.4 33.6 19.8 24.3 1053 1.93
Oct-96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Nov-96 124.5 124.5 0.0 0.0 1 0.00
Dec-96 31.8 27.3 13.3 20.0 120 4.69
Jan-97 35.7 30.0 17.0 22.6 3229 1.02
Feb-97 36.4 30.6 19.7 24.3 '3772 1.02
Mar-97 34.5 28.8 19.2 24.0 3175 1.10
Apr-97 34.6 29.1 18.1 23.3 3674 0.99
May-97 34.3 29.1 17.3 22.8 4060 0.92
Jun-97 33.4 27.0 17.6 23.0 3075 1.07
Jul-97 33.9 28.5 17.3 22.8 4185 0.91
Aug-97 33.3 27.9 16.5 22.2 4043 0.90
Sep-97 32.7 27.3 16.2 22.1 3014 1.04
Oct-97 34.5 29.1 17.7 23.1 4487 0.89
Nov-97 35.1 29.1 18.8 23.8 3977 0.97
Dec-97 33.6 27.9 16.4 22.2 3156 1.02
Jan-98 34.8 30.0 17.6 23.0 3995 0.94
Feb-98 35.3 30.0 17.2 22.7 3746 0.96
Mar-98 35.2 30.0 18.6 23.6 4246 0.93
Apr-98 32.2 27.3 14.7 21.0 2977 0.99
May-98 33.5 28.2 16.4 22.2 3807 0.93
Jun-98 33.9 28.8 16.3 22.1 3759 0.93
Jul-98 35.9 30.9 17.5 22.9 4640 0.87
Aug-98 31.4 27.3 12.9 19.6 2454 1.02
Sep-98 34.2 29.1 16.0 21.9 4219 0.87
Oct-98 34.8 29.1 16.9 22.5 4064 0.91
Nov-98 35.5 30.0 17.4 22.8 4092 0.92
Dec-98 33.7 29.1 15.3 21.4 3212 0.97
Jan-99 35.0 30.0 16.1 22.0 3829 0.92
Feb-99 35.3 30.0 17.3 22.8 3332 1.02
Mar-99 36.2 31.2 . 17.7 23.0 4134 0.92
Apr-99 35.9 30.9 18.2 23.4 3419 1.03
May-99 35.7 30.9 17.5 22.9 4154 0.91
Jun-99 33.2 29.1 14.8 21.1 3766 0.88
Jul-99 34.6 30.0 16.3 22.1 4567 0.84
Aug-99 35.0 30.0 15.9 21.8 3368 0.97
Sep-99 35.3 30.0 16.6 22.3 3937 0.91
Oct-99 34.2 30.0 15.1 21.3 3134 0.98
Nov-99 35.8 30.0 18.0 23.2 4440 0.90
Dec-99 34.8 30.0 16.2 22.1 3112 1.02
Jan-OO 36.0 30.0 17.1 22.7 4371 0.88
Feb-OO 34.5 30.0 16.4 22.2 4083 0.89
Mar-OO 35.1 30.0 17.8 23.1 4229 0.92
Apr-OO 32.9 28.2 15.2 21.4 2625 1.07
May-OO 32.7 28.1 15.7 21.7 4658 0.82
Jun-OO 32.0 27.9 13.7 20.3 3613 0.87
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99%
Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
Jul-OO 34.1 30.0 15.4 21.5 4117 0.86
Aug-OO 35.1 30.0 15.3 21.4 4186 0.85
Sep-OO 33.5 29.1 13.9 20.4 3245 0.92
Oct-OO 34.5 30.0 15.2 21.4 3682 0.91
Nov-OO 33.8 29.1 15.1 21.3 4550 0.81
Dec-OO 32.0 27.9 13.2 19.9 2378 1.05
Jan-01 34.0 30.0 14.3 20.7 4883 0.76
Feb-01 33.8 29.4 14.1 20.6 3916 0.85
Mar-01 35.4 30.9 16.0 21.9 4185 0.87
Apr-01 32.5 28.2 13.3 20.0 3063 0.93
May-01 32.9 28.2 14.0 20.5 4478 0.79
Jun-01 33.5 28.8 14.5 20.8 3566 0.90
Jul-01 34.9 30.0 15.7 21.7 3751 0.91
Aug-01 34.0 30.0 14.5 20.9 4226 0.83
Sep-01 32.8 28.2 13.2 19.9 2807 0.97
Oct-01 33.6 29.1 14.6 20.9 4407 0.81
Nov-01 32.5 27.9 13.8 20.3 4783 0.76
Dec-01 29.4 25.5 10.5 17.8 2199 0.98
Jan-02 32.4 27.3 12.6 19.4 4284 0.76
Feb-02 32.2 28.2 12.6 19.5 3907 0.80
Mar-02 31.8 27.0 13.3 20.0 3501 0.87
Apr-02 33.7 29.1 14.5 20.9 4244 0.82
May-02 32.5 27.9 13.6 20.2 4551 0.77
Jun-02 32.1 27.9 12.8 19.6 3567 0.84
Jul-02 32.2 28.2 12.7 19.5 3928 0.80
Aug-02 31.0 27.0 12.2 19.1 3958 0.78
Sep-02 30.3 26.7 11.5 18.6 3413 0.82
Oct-02 32.7 29.1 12.8 19.6 4521 0.75
Nov-02 33.3 28.8 13.6 20.2 4128 0.81
Dec-02 32.3 28.2 12.2 19.1 3341 0.85
Jan-03 33.1 29.1 13.7 20.2 4242 0.80
Feb-03 33.4 29.1 14.4 20.8 3521 0.90
Mar-03 35.6 30.9 16.5 22.2 3493 0.97
Apr-03 32.8 28.2 14.3 20.7 3588 0.89
May-03 32.5 28.2 13.6 20.2 4160 0.81
Jun-03 32.0 27.9 14.0 20.5 3286 0.92
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Table A7
Monthly statistics for middle income residential water demand
99%
Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kl) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kl)
Jul-96 20.9 0.9 0.5 0.7 373 0.1
Aug-96 22.4 19.8 6.2 13.6 2550 0.7
Sep-96 24.0 21.0 7.9 15.4 365 2.1
Oct-96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Nov-96 44.4 44.4 32.0 31.0 2 56.4
Dec-96 22.4 20.7 5.2 12.5 251 2.0
Jan-97 24.9 21.9 7.6 15.1 3050 0.7
Feb-97 24.5 21.3 7.6 15.1 3338 0.7
Mar-97 24.1 21.3 7.7 15.2 3224 0.7
Apr-97 23.7 20.4 7.8 15.3 3321 0.7
May-97 23.9 20.7 7.5 15.0 3463 0.7
Jun-97 23.1 20.4 6.9 14.4 3255 0.7
Jul-97 23.0 20.1 6.7 14.2 3417 0.6
Aug-97 23.0 20.1 7.1 14.6 3413 0.6
Sep-97 22.3 19.8 6.0 13.5 3212 0.6
Oct-97 23.0 20.4 6.7 14.2 3530 0.6
Nov-97 23.3 20.4 6.5 14.0 3338 0.6
Dec-97 23.2 21.0 6.2 13.7 3018 0.6
Jan-98 23.6 21.0 6.4 13.9 3479 0.6
Feb-98 24.4 21.3 7.3 14.8 3190 0.7
Mar-98 23.6 20.4 7.0 14.5 3510 0.6
Apr-98 23.4 20.7 6.7 14.1 3195 0.6
May-98 23.1 20.7 6.5 14.0 3387 0.6
Jun-98 23.0 20.1 6.6 14.0 3408 0.6
Jul-98 23.4 20.4 7.0 14.5 3713 0.6
Aug-98 22.9 20.4 6.2 13.6 3253 0.6
Sep-98 23.1 20.4 6.4 13.8 3547 0.6
Oct-98 23.0 20.7 6.3 13.7 3591 0.6
Nov-98 23.0 20.7 6.1 13.5 3401 0.6
Dec-98 23.2 20.7 6.1 13.5 3386 0.6
Jan-99 23.9 21.3 6.3 13.8 3576 0.6
Feb-99 23.9 21.3 6.3 13.8 3518 0.6
Mar-99 24.1 21.0 7.1 14.5 3327 0.6
Apr-99 23.6 21.0 6.5 14.0 3539 0.6
May-99 22.7 20.4 5.8 13.2 3612 0.6
Jun-99 22.1 19.8 5.3 12.6 3443 0.6
Jul-99 22.4 20.1 6.3 13.7 4349 0.5
Aug-99 22.8 20.4 5.7 13.1 3748 0.6
Sep-99 22.8 20.4 5.9 13.3 4109 0.5
Oct-99 23.0 20.7 6.0 13.5 3877 0.6
Nov-99 23.0 20.7 6.4 13.9 4032 0.6
Dec-99 23.6 21.3 6.3 13.8 3558 0.6
Jan-OO 23.8 21.3 6.2 13.6 4504
0.5
Feb-OO 23.5 21.0 6.2 13.6 3987
0.6




Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
Apr-OO 22.9 20.4 6.2 13.7 3388 0.6
May-OO 22.1 19.8 5.7 13.1 4408 0.5
Jun-OO 21.9 19.8 5.5 12.8 3990 0.5
Jul-OO 22.1 20.4 5.2 12.5 4227 0.5
Aug-OO 22.2 20.1 5.1 12.4 4196 0.5
Sep-OO 22.5 20.4 5.5 12.8 3784 0.5
Oct-OO 22.2 20.1 5.5 12.8 3890 0.5
Nov-OO 22.3 20.1 6.0 13.5 4339 0.5
Dec-OO 23.3 21.3 6.3 13.7 1962 0.8
Jan-01 22.6 21.0 5.6 13.0 5899 0.4
Feb-01 22.8 20.4 5.8 13.1 4206 0.5
Mar-01 22.8 20.4 5.5 12.9 3985 0.5
Apr-01 22.4 20.4 5.4 12.8 3830 0.5
May-01 21.8 19.8 5.5 12.8 4395 0.5
Jun-01 22.1 20.1 5.2 12.4 3997 0.5
Jul-01 21.9 20.1 5.1 12.4 3902 0.5
Aug-01 21.7 19.8 4.8 12.0 4154 0.5
Sep-01 21.8 20.0 5.0 12.3 3652 0.5
Oct-01 21.5 19.5 5.2 12.5 4177 0.5
Nov-01 21.7 19.8 5.0 12.2 4414 0.5
Dec-01 21.9 20.7 4.8 12.0 3563 0.5
Jan-02 22.1 20.7 4.8 12.1 4273 0.5
Feb-02 21.8 20.1 4.9 12.1 4068 0.5
Mar-02 21.7 19.8 5.0 12.3 4082 0.5
Apr-02 21.7 19.8 5.1 12.3 4167 0.5
May-02 21.2 18.9 5.4 12.7 4409 0.5
Jun-02 21.2 18.9 5.3 12.6 3970 0.5
Jul-02 21.2 19.2 5.1 12.3 4100 0.5
Aug-02 20.8 18.9 5.0 12.3 4279 0.5
Sep-02 21.0 18.9 4.8 12.0 3909 0.5
Oct-02 21.1 19.2 5.0 12.2 4367 0.5
Nov-02 21.5 19.2 5.4 12.7 4189 0.5
Dec-02 21.7 19.8 5.1 12.4 3889 0.5
Jan-03 22.3 20.7 5.4 12.8 4274 0.5
Feb-03 22.3 20.7 5.5 12.8 3963 0.5
Mar-03 22.1 20.4 5.4 12.8 3478 0.6
Apr-03 21.8 19.8 5.1 12.3 3977 0.5
May-03 21.6 19.5 5.1 12.4 4093 . 0.5
Jun-03 21.5 19.8 5.5 12.9 2966 0.6
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Table AB
Monthly statistics for low income residential water demand
99%
Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
Jul-96 26.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 12 0.5
Aug-96 19.5 17.4 4.8 11.9 897 1.0
Sep-96 21.8 19.2 5.2 12.5 46 4.7
Oct-96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Nov-96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Dec-96 24.5 22.5 0.8 4.8 3 7.2
Jan-97 21.7 18.3 7.1 14.6 965 1.2
Feb-97 22.5 19.8 6.3 13.7 926 1.2
Mar-97 21.4 18.3 7.2 14.7 943 1.2
Apr-97 20.7 17.7 5.5 12.9 960 1.1
May-97 20.4 18.0 5.2 12.5 968 1.0
Jun-97 20.1 17.7 6.2 13.7 952 1.1
Jul-97 20.2 17.4 5.9 13.3 970 1.1
Aug-97 19.8 17.4 5.7 13.1 978 1.1
Sep-97 20.1 17.4 5.9 13.3 953 1.1
Oct-97 20.4 17.7 6.1 13.5 983 1.1
Nov-97 20.4 18.0 5.5 12.9 972 1.1
Dec-97 20.1 18.3 4.9 12.1 956 1.0
Jan-98 20.7 18.3 5.7 13.0 980 1.1
Feb-98 21.4 18.9 5.7 13.0 967 1.1
Mar-98 21.1 18.3 5.8 13.2 979 1.1
Apr-98 20.3 17.7 5.9 13.3 955 1.1
May-98 20.3 18.0 5.5 12.9 967 1.1
Jun-98 19.4 17.1 5.2 12.5 976 1.0
Jul-98 19.9 17.1 5.9 13.3 1590 0.9
Aug-98 18.9 16.1 5.0 12.3 1608 0.8
Sep-98 18.7 15.9 5.4 12.7 1677 0.8
Oct-98 19.3 16.5 5.9 13.3 1683 0.8
Nov-98 19.6 16.5 6.1 13.5 1704 0.8
Dec-98 19.8 17.1 5.7 13.1 1521 0.9
Jan-99 19.5 17.7 5.6 12.9 1997 0.7
Feb-99 20.2 18.0 5.5 12.8 1951 0.7
Mar-99 20.0 17.1 6.0 13.5 2075 0.8
Apr-99 19.8 17.1 5.9 13.4 1876 0.8
May-99 17.8 15'.0 5.1 12.4 2177 0.7
Jun-99 17.5 15.0 5.0 12.2 1957 0.7
Jul-99 18.4 15.0 6.4 13.8 4407 0.5
Aug-99 18.4 15.6 6.1 13.5 3895 0.6
Sep-99 18.2 15.0 5.9 13.3 4091 0.5
Oct-99 18.6 15.6 5.9 13.3 3738 0.6
Nov-99 18.1 15.0 5.6 12.9 4233 0.5
Dec-99 19.7 16.8 6.1 13.6 3407 0.6
Jan-OO 19.4 16.5 6.0 13.4 4474 0.5
Feb-OO 19.3 16.5 5.7 13.1 3990 0.5
Mar-OD 18.6 15.6 5.6 13.0 4671 0.5
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99%
Meter Std Sample Confidence
Read Mean Median Variance Deviation Size Interval
Date (kL) (kL) (kL) (kL) (No.) (kL)
Apr-OO 17.8 15.0 5.1 12.4 3469 0.5
May-OO 16.6 14.1 4.7 11.9 4140 0.5
Jun-OO 16.3 13.8 4.7 11.9 3732 0.5
Jul-OO 16.0 13.5 4.2 11.2 4449 0.4
Aug-OO 16.0 13.5 4.0 11.0 4198 0.4
Sep-OO 16.3 13.5 4.2 11.2 3389 0.5
Oct-OO 15.9 13.5 3.8 10.7 4208 0.4
Nov-OO 16.1 13.8 4.0 11.0 4093 0.4
Dec-OO 17.5 15.0 4.4 11.4 2746 0.6
Jan-01 16.4 15.0 3.8 10.7 5092 0.4
Feb-01 17.3 15.0 4.4 11.4 4218 0.5
Mar-01 17.4 15.0 4.7 11.9 4288 0.5
Apr-01 16.8 14.4 4.6 11.8 3462 0.5
May-01 16.1 13.8 4.1 11.1 4668 0.4
Jun-01 16.1 13.8 4.3 11.3 3570 0.5
Jul-01 15.8 13.5 4.2 11.2 3947 0.5
Aug-01 15.5 13.5 4.0 10.9 4160 0.4
Sep-01 15.5 13.5 3.9 10.8 3650 0.5
Oct-01 15.4 13.2 3.8 10.7 4114 0.4
Nov-01 15.8 13.5 4.0 10.9 4340 0.4
Dec-01 16.2 14.4 3.6 10.4 3064 0.5
Jan-02 16.2 15.0 3.6 10.4 4615 0.4
Feb-02 16.8 15.0 3.9 10.8 3791 0.5
Mar-02 16.1 13.8 3.7 10.6 3983 0.4
Apr-02 15.9 13.5 3.8 10.7 4243 0.4
May-02 14.9 12.6 3.6 10.4 4635 0.4
Jun-02 14.6 12.3 3.5 10.3 3706 0.4
Jul-02 14.4 12.3 3.4 10.0 4071 0.4
Aug-02 14.1 12.0 3.3 10.0 4499 0.4
Sep-02 14.4 12.3 3.5 10.2 3829 0.4
Oct-02 14.8 12.6 3.6 10.4 4460 0.4
Nov-02 15.0 12.9 3.6 10.4 4012 0.4
Dec-02 15.5 13.4 3.6 10.4 3832 0.4
Jan-03 16.2 14.1 3.8 10.7 4440 0.4
Feb-03 16.2 14.4 3.7 10.6 3834 0.4
Mar-03 15.9 13.5 3.7 10.6 3899 0.4
Apr-03 15.8 13.7 3.7 10.6 3978 0.4
May-03 15.2 13.2 3.5 10.3 4057 0.4
Jun-03 14.4 12.0 3.5 10.2 3409 0.4
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Figure B3: Change in frequency distribution of high income households between 1996
and 2003
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Table Bl: Frequency distribution of HIGH income households water consumption
during the period 1996 to 2003
1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ Acc.Sum
Bill 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002/2003
(kL) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
3 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0
6 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.9
9 3.1 3.5 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.3 6.1
12 4.8 5.0 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 10.8
15 6.3 6.9 6.3 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.5 17.3
18 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.9 7.8 7.8 8.2 25.5
21 7.7 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.9 8.1 33.6
24 8.4 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.2 8.6 8.8 42.4
27 7.5 7.6 7.6 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.7 51.1
30 6.7 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.2 7.4 58.5
33 5.8 5.9 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.7 65.1
36 5.4 5.0 5.2 6.0 5.6 5.8 5.4 70.5
39 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 75.5
42 3.9 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.8 79.3
45 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.4 82.8
48 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 85.7
51 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 87.9
54 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 89.8
57 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 91.4
60 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 92.7
63 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 93.8
66 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 94.6
69 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 95.3
72 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 96.0
75 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 96.6
78 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 97.1
81 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 97.4
84 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 97.8
87 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 98.1
90 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 98.4
93 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 98.5
96 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 98.7
99 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 98.9
102 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 99.0
105 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.1
108 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.2
III 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.3
114 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.4
117 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.5
120 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.5
123 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.6
126 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.7
129 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.7
132 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.8
135 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 99.8
138 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
141 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 99.8
144 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 99.9
147 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
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1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ Acc.Sum
Bill 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002/2003
(kL) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
150 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
153 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
156 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
159 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
162 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
165 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
168 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
171 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
174 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
177 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
180 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table B2: Frequency distribution of MIDDLE income households water consumption
during the period 1996 to 2003
1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ . 2001/ 2002/ Acc.Sum
Bill 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002/2003
(kL) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
3 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4
6 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.1 4.5 5.2 7.6
9 7.0 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.8 8.6 8.6 16.1
12 9.8 10.0 9.1 9.7 9.7 10.1 9.9 26.0
15 11.1 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.5 11.6 37.6
18 11.5 11.9 12.1 12.0 11.9 12.1 11.7 49.4
21 10.8 10.2 11.5 10.7 11.0 11.0 10.6 60.0
24 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.6 9.8 9.8 9.6 69.6
27 8.0 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.2 7.7 7.8 77.4
30 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.7 83.1
33 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.5 87.6
36 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.2 90.8
39 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 93.2
42 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 94.8
45 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 96.1
48 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 97.0
51 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 97.7
54 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 98.2
57 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 98.5
60 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 98.8
63 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 99.1
66 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 99.2
69 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 99.3
72 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.4
75 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.5
78 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.6
81 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.7
84 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.7
87 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
90 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
93 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
96 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
99 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
102 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
105 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
108 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
I 11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
117 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
123 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
126 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
129 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
132 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
135 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
138 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
141 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
144 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
147 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
150 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100:0
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Table B3: Frequency distribution of LOW income households water consumption '.
during the period 1996 to 2003
1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ Acc.Sum
Bill 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2002/2003
(kL) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
3 2.8 3.0 3.8 4.9 6.1 6.8 7.9 8.7
6 5.4 6.0 8.3 10.1 12.1 13.0 13.6 22.3
9 10.3 11.7 12.7 13.7 14.5 14.9 15.4 37.7
12 11.1 11.0 12.4 13.0 13.6 13.8 13.4 51.2
15 12.3 12.2 12.2 11.2 12.2 12.9 12.5 63.6
18 12.3 11.8 11.4 10.7 10.4 10.5 10.2 73.8
21 10.2 10.0 8.7 8.6 8.0 7.3 7.4 81.2
24 9.2 8.4 6.9 6.5 6.0 6.1 5.4 86.5
27 6.1 6.2 5.0 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.1 90.6
30 4.3 4.4 4.8 3.7 3.1 2.9 2.7 93.4
33 3.4 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.9 95.3
36 2.4 3.0 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 96.5
39 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.9 97.3
42 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 98.0
45 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 98.5
48 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 98.9
51 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 99.2
54 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 99.3
57 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 99.5
60 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.6
63 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.7
66 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 99.7
69 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 99.7
72 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 99.8
75 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
78 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8
81 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
84 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
87 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
90 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
102 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
105 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9
108 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
III 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
117 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Appendix C: Regression data
Low Inc. Middle Inc. High Inc. Max Nominal Nominal Real Real
Meter Mean Mean Mean Daily Monthly Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
Read demand demand demand Temp Rainfall 6-30 kL >30 kL 6-30 kL >30 kL
Date (kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (CO) (mm) (R/kL) (R1kL) CPI (R1kL) (R/kL)
Jul-96 26.7 20.9 35.1 20.7 261.4 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Aug-96 19.5 22.4 31.3 21.9 12.7 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Sep-96 21.8 24.0 38.4 23.3 22.9 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Oct-96 22.5* 23.2* 35.0* 23.8 120.8 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Nov-96 22.5* 23.2* 35.0* 25.8 72.7 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Dec-96 24.5 22.4 31.8 27.7 72.7 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Jan-97 21.7 24.9 35.7 27.9 187.1 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Feb-97 22.5 24.5 36.4 27.6 99.5 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Mar-97 21.4 24.1 34.5 27.1 59.6 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Apr-97 20.7 23.7 34.6 24.9 167.9 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
May-97 20.4 23.9 34.3 23.2 40.5 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Jun-97 20.1 23.1 33.4 22.7 89.4 1.77 2.22 82.5 2.15 2.69
Jul-97 20.2 23.0 33.9 21.6 159.2 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Aug-97 19.8 23.0 33.3 23.6 16.6 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Sep-97 20.1 22.3 32.7 23.1 71.2 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Oct-97 20.4 23.0 34.5 24.3 151.3 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Nov-97 20.4 23.3 35.1 23.6 277.2 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Dec-97 20.1 23.2 33.6 26.1 71.3 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Jan-98 20.7 23.6 34.8 27.6 93.3 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Feb-98 21.4 24.4 35.3 28.2 158.3 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Mar-98 21.1 23.6 35.2 27.1 83.8 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Apr-98 20.3 23.4 32.2 26.4 237.4 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
May-98 20.3 23.1 33.5 24.5 52.2 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Jun-98 19.4 23.0 33.9 23.1 0.1 2.13 3.19 87.0 2.45 3.67
Jul-98 19.9 23.4 35.9 23.2 22.9 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35



































Low Inc. Middle Inc. High Inc. Max Nominal Nominal Real Real
Mean Mean Mean Daily Monthly Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
demand demand demand Temp Rainfall 6-30 kL >30 kL 6-30 kL >30 kL
(kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (CO) (mm) (R/kL) (R/kL) CPI (R/kL) (R/kL)
18.7 23.1 34.2 23.5 25.5 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
19.3 23.0 34.8 24.3 64.5 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
19.6 23.0 35.5 26.4 106.4 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
19.8 23.2 33.7 26.5 132.6 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
19.5 23.9 35.0 29.0 94.0 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
20.2 23.9 35.3 28.8 239.3 . 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
20.0 24.1 36.2 29.1 44.2 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
19.8 23.6 35.9 27.8 36.7 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
17.8 22.7 35.7 24.8 36.5 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
17.5 22.1 33.2 24.3 74.4 2.53 5.06 94.5 2.68 5.35
18.4 22.4 34.6 23.6 3.5 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
18.4 22.8 35.0 24.3 12.2 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
18.2 22.8 35.3 24.0 74.1 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
18.6 23.0 34.2 24.3 195.9 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
18.1 23.0 35.8 26.5 59.1 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
19.7 23.6 34.8 27.5 291.8 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
19.4 23.8 36.0 27.2 181.7 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
19.3 23.5 34.5 28.7 157.3 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
18.6 23.1 35.1 28.1 148.8 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
17.8 22.9 32.9 25.3 63.2 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
16.6 22.1 32.7 23.4 167.5 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
16.3 21.9 32.0 23.7 3.8 2.89 5.78 97.1 2.98 5.95
16.0 22.1 34.1 22.8 20.2 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
16.0 22.2 35.1 24.1 17.7 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
16.3 22.5 33.5 23.6 62.8 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
15.9 22.2 34.5 23.4 60.2 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
16.1 22.3 33.8 25.7 142.0 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
17.5 23.3 32.0 27.1 124.5 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
16.4 22.6 34.0 27.9 65.5 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
17.3 22.8 33.8 28.3 77.4 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
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Low Inc. Middle Inc. High Inc. Max Nominal Nominal Real Real
Meter Mean Mean Mean Daily Monthly Tariff Tariff Tariff Tariff
Read demand demand demand Temp Rainfall 6-30 kL >30 kL 6-30 kL >30 kL
Date (kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (kLlMonth) (Co) (mm) (R/kL) (R1kL) CPI (R1kL) (R1kL)
Mar-01 17.4 22.8 35.4 28.9 43.4 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
Apr-01 16.8 22.4 32.5 25.6 90.1 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
May-01 16.1 21.8 32.9 25.5. 12.5 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
Jun-01 16.1 22.1 33.5 25.0 0.1 3.27 6.54 103.6 3.16 6.31
Jul-01 15.8 21.9 34.9 23.5 45.3 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Aug-01 15.5 21.7 34.0 24.0 0.3 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Sep-01 15.5 21.8 32.8 23.5 145.4 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Oct-01 15.4 21.5 33.6 24.8 171.3 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Nov-01 15.8 21.7 32.5 26.2 191.2 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Dec-01 16.2 21.9 29.4 27.0 142.9 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Jan-02 16.2 22.1 32.4 28.4 155.8 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Feb-02 16.8 21.8 32.2 27.4 154.7 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Mar-02 16.1 21.7 31.8 28.4 21.3 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Apr-02 15.9 21.7 33.7 27.2 162.6 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
May-02 14.9 21.2 32.5 25.2 3.3 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Jun-02 14.6 21.2 32.1 23.3 23.8 4.25 8.50 108.3 3.92 7.85
Jul-02 14.4 21.2 32.2 23.0 151.5 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Aug-02 14.1 20.8 31.0 22.8 53.9 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Sep-02 14.4 21.0 30.3 23.6 43.6 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Oct-02 14.8 21.1 32.7 25.3 32.4 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Nov-02 15.0 21.5 33.3 25.3 64.2 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Dec-02 15.5 21.7 32.3 27.5 113.3 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Jan-03 16.2 22.3 33.1 28.0 102.1 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Feb-03 16.2 22.3 33.4 29.9 15.7 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Mar-03 15.9 22.1 35.6 29.1 96.3 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Apr-03 15.8 21.8 32.8 27.1 121.8 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
May-03 15.2 21.6 32.5 24.5* 47.3* 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
Jun-03 14.4 21.5 32.0 23.7* 27.5* 5.21 10.42 121.0 4.31 8.61
















Total cost of production divided by the total number of
units supplied
Conventional metered water supply directly from a
municipal water main without the intervention of a break
pressure tank.
A flow restricting device is installed on the water supply
connection to reduce consumption. Normally a sanction
imposed for non payment of water account.
The cost of providing the next or last unit in the long run,
that is including investments in capital infrastructure to
increase capacity.
The additional cost of production to produce one more
unit.
The price at which quantity demanded equals quantity
supplied, so that there are no unsatisfied buyers or sellers.
Residential properties which consist of a cluster of houses
on a single property. le block of flats or housing
complexes.
The actual price paid for a good at the time of purchase.
It is not possible to increase overall welfare without
causing some individuals in society to become poorer.
Goods which are exclusive, i.e. if used by one person
cannot be used by another, for example a pair of shoes.
Income received in excess of the cost of production, i.e.
profits.
Goods which are non exclusive, ie once it is available, no
one can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of its use,
for example street lights.
The nominal price of a good multiplied by the consumer
price index (CPI) to give a real (indexed) price based on










The revenue received through the sale of water must equal
the cost of delivering the service, i.e. breakeven pricing,
making neither a profit or deficit
Sufficient revenue must be raised through the sale of water
to cover the cost of the service
Metered water supply from a break pressure tank
connected to the municipal water main.
A situation where a home owner constructs single roomed
dwellings at the back of his property and rents them out.
The cost of providing the next or last unit while keeping
the level of fixed investment constant
Residential properties which consist of a single free
standing house.
The satisfaction a consumer receIves from consummg a
commodity.
A consumer who is more than three months in arrears is
assumed to be consuming more water than they are willing
to pay for and is therefore not a well behaved consumer.
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